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This thesis research evaluates the extent to which IT decision makers consider security concerns and 
requirements while performing technology acquisition in small-to-medium sized organizations. The 
research sought to understand what factors influence decision maker attitudes on the role of security 
during acquisition and how these attitudes and decision strategies affect security throughout the system 
lifecycle. Through an interview based study with fifteen IT decision makers from small-to-medium sized 
organizations, decision maker attitudes and organizational practices were evaluated. The findings 
suggest that security is not often considered during the acquisition process and is not a crucial element 
of acquisition decision and selections strategies for a majority of the sample. There is, however, a 
significant relationship between acquisition and security throughout the system lifecycle and the 
findings further suggest that end-user consideration and involvement are crucial elements for both 
acquisition and security. The relative importance of security consideration by decision makers is 
discussed herein and suggestions are provided for steps organizations may undertake to improve their 
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4 Introduction   
This research investigated attitudes and behaviors related to the role of security in IT component 
acquisition. The study identified decision making strategies used by IT decision makers in selecting new 
components (e.g., software, hardware, or external services) and systems for internal usage. The 
identified strategies were evaluated and analyzed to determine to what extent, if any, IT security (risk) is 
considered by the IT decision maker during the acquisition phase. In addition, IT decision makers' 
strategies were juxtaposed with other core factors, such as end-user involvement, to determine if they 
had any relevant impact on the decision makers' ability to perceive and plan for future risk.  
The population of interest in this study consisted of small- to medium-sized enterprises. The appropriate 
IT decision maker for each organization was identified by each participating organization and one-on-
one in-person interviews were conducted with each participant. Previous research studies, guidelines, 
and recommendations have tended to focus on large enterprises. However, smaller organizations often 
do not have similar resources or circumstances. In order to expand the body of research, this study 
elected to focus exclusively on small- to medium-sized organizations. 
4.1 Scope & Significance  
While contemporary society has recognized the importance of IT security management at the larger 
enterprise level, there are still many smaller organizations that do not understand how to address these 
concerns. In general, it is very difficult and time intensive for any organization to exactly quantify the 
possible loss resulting from a security incident or to predict the likelihood of an attack on any given IT 
environment. Due to the complexity and cost of planning, many organizations upfront investments in 
security are minimal. This often leads to reactive, "fire-fighting" approaches to security. However, such 
an approach may lead to extended downtime, loss of reputation, and financial loss when an attack 
actually occurs. 
One of the more popular paths in the current body of literature seeks to address this security dilemma 
by improving the behavior of the end-users who interact with an organization’s IT systems. In these 
studies, it is understood that users tend to have a low technical-competency and are prone to either 
abuse or misuse IT systems. By way of metaphor, it has been suggested that each individual user 
represents the link in a chain and that an IT system is only as secure as the weakest link. This research 
does not seek to disprove the previous research, but suggests that the root cause of poor IT security 
practices should not be attributed to the end-users. This philosophy makes the often-flawed assumption 
that the IT staff and relevant decision makers sufficiently understand their own security concerns and 
have done their due diligence to create a secure environment. In this study I sought to expand the 
existing metaphor to better address the role of the IT staff: While the users continue to form the links in 
the chain, their individual weakness become irrelevant if the lock (represented by the IT staff and 
relevant decision makers) holding the chain together is not fastened securely. This study sought to 
evaluate this theory by investigating what beliefs, practices, and contributing factors enable the creation 
of a strong lock, which I defined as an IT decision maker who has done her due diligence to proactively 
address and mitigate potential IT threats for her organization. 
This study does not attempt to suggest that there is a simple formula or standard that can be applied to 
better predict the threat to a given IT system nor does it attempt to create some universal criteria for 
effective decision making (e.g., a checklist) as it is related to information security. Instead, in this study I 
argue that IT decision makers' acquisition decision strategies may either positively or adversely affect 
their ability to discover, understand, and plan for potential risk. Furthermore, this study also suggests 
that an individual’s security assessment strategy is influenced by experience and environmental factors 
which may lead to an unrealistic assessment of an organization’s security requirements or may lead to a 
security evaluation which is supported by non-truths and misperceptions.  
The research focused primarily on the acquisition phase of the system lifecycle. The acquisition phase 
occurs after a need has been identified and the decision has been made to purchase or otherwise 
acquire a solution rather than to build the component internally. Thus, it is most vital to evaluate a 
component's fitness and security implications during this phase, before the component has been 
introduced into the system and other components or business processes have become dependent upon 
it. After a component has been selected and implemented, it is often very difficult or in some cases 
impossible to remove it from the overall IT system. Therefore, it is critical that IT decision makers are 
aware of security requirements during this phase in order to reduce reactive security management. In 
addition, when security is considered in this early stage it can help increase security awareness and ease 
security management in later stages of the system lifecycle. If a product is known to have good security 
support or integration with security reporting or monitoring systems, this is one less patch or concern 
that must later be addressed or that may only become apparent after a security incident has already 
occurred. 
This research investigated and analyzed examples of strategies, attitudes, and external factors which 
improve security consciousness and awareness during the acquisition phase of the system lifecycle. 
Through this analysis other IT practitioners and decision makers can learn how to modify their own 
behavior and environment in order to increase the security of their IT systems. Furthermore, this study 
will help decision makers avoid common pitfalls, which may lead to a false perceptions of a security, 
foundationless trust, misinformed decisions, and/or selections made with insufficient qualification. 
4.2 Research Questions 
At the highest level, this research study sought to discover the human factors and decision making 
processes involved in application and system acquisition in small-to-medium sized corporate IT 
environments, and to what extent, if any, during this process security concerns are addressed. In order 
to address this greater concern, this study evaluated the following more specific questions: 
Q1: To what extent, if any, is security considered during the acquisition process?  
Q2: To what extent, if any, is security considered by the participants and their corresponding 
organization throughout the system lifecycle? What is the extent of security awareness and 
understanding? 
Q3: Does the relative performance of decision makers (and their organizations) in the areas of 
experience, management attitudes, and user interaction significantly predict quality of decision making? 
Q4: Does the relative quality of decision makers' decision strategies significantly predict the level of 
security awareness and understanding demonstrated by the participants and their organization? 
4.3 Literature review  
4.3.1 Relationship to Current Body of Literature 
While the body of research is limited in terms of case studies evaluating deployment procedures, there 
is a growing interest in human factors and its relationship to security. In addition, previous findings from 
the field of psychology in decision theory and science contribute to the foundation of this research. 
Besnard and Arief note that “computer security is an area that cognitive scientists have not investigated 
as deeply as human computer interaction or problem solving” [1]. Generally, as will be outlined below, 
previous research has focused on end-users with limited analysis of IT practitioners. I believe a bias 
exists where it is assume that IT professionals have a higher degree of security education and 
understanding. However, there are surely many decision makers who have no background, 
understanding, or concerns about security. Decision makers may have specialized knowledge and a 
more technical understanding of a problem, but generally they can fall prey to the same traps as end-
users. This is especially true of general psychological principles on human rationality and decision 
making, which are mostly independent of technical domain. The literature that approaches security 
from a human factors perspective goes to great lengths to explain that security and usability are often in 
confrontation; users will ignore security concerns when there is pressure to perform or simply when 
security rules present undesired hurdles to achievement of goals. One of the key findings emerging in 
the body of literature is the general lack of awareness and understanding of security concerns. Also 
noteworthy is that organizational cultures tend not to put a strong enough emphasis on security. Many 
papers have commented on users as “the weakest link” [2][3][4][5], that a failure of an individual in 
terms of security can cause breaks throughout an organization. While it is presumed that IT 
professionals should be the strongest link, I would say that the IT staff metaphorically represents a lock. 
That is to say that if they are not securing the chain and holding it together, there is no defense 
whatsoever.  
4.3.2 Organization of this Review 
This review of literature will cover major themes spanning from decision making and psychology based 
concepts to the role of security in software design and organizational practices. Among these are social 
and psychological aspects dealing with the nature of human thinking and decision making and issues of 
trust relationships. I then move into an overview on how individuals react to security situations and how 
humans effect security situations. Next, I provide a brief examination of the effects of software design 
and development on security and relate some of the proposed techniques for increasing software 
security situations. Drawing from the above, I relate the ideas and studies in the body of research to IT 
acquisition decision makers and other IT professionals. Finally, an analysis of the research methodology 
and analyses in the body of literature is presented.  
4.3.3 Human Psychology and Decision Making 
Before conducting an analysis of how individuals think about security and deal with security related 
topics, a general understanding of human thought process is necessary. Sasse et al. provide some basic 
insight into the way humans evaluate a given situation [5]. Building upon previous research in 
psychology they relate that individuals are inclined to take the easiest route rather than evaluating a 
situation and appreciating all possible consequences. Various factors such as internal and external 
pressures can make decisions difficult; as the level of stress increases for a given decision an individual is 
less likely to consider consequences in order to solve the solution expediently. Besnard & Arief also 
supported this view, noting specifically that human reasoning is not based on achieving perfection [1]. 
Rather the authors’ research indicated that cognitive acts involve an analysis of tradeoffs, which results 
in the individual choosing some perceived optimal path. This introduces new risks since the individual 
may not consider all consequences. In their analysis Besnard & Arief evaluated a case study covering an 
accident on December 30, 1999 at the JCO nuclear fuel processing plant in Japan. Workers at the plant 
broke with the normal processing procedures and used an illegal and dangerous procedure to expedite 
their tasks in order to make it easier to perform their jobs. As a result, two workers died when the 
process triggered a critical accident. Upon further review of the incident, it was determined that 
management’s drive for productivity and relatively low concern for safety significantly contributed to 
the incident. It seems that humans are preprogrammed to make convenience decisions, and 
furthermore that irrational decision making increases with the amount of stress the individual is under 
at any given point. Risk (the potential for some action or decision to result in harm or loss, now or in the 
future) and stress seem directly proportional; however, individuals seem less likely to consider risk as 
the stress increases.  
4.3.4 Issues of Trust    
To a great extent the level of trust in a particular situation will affect how willing a user is to consider 
risk. Mayer et al. examined research and definitions of trust from multiple disciplines [6]. Trust can be 
understood as a reduction in the perception of risk, which may be the result of a relationship, analysis, 
or other factors which may lead one to believe that there is some manner of reducing risk. Herein I will 
define trust as the level to which an individual feels safe and is confident in the accuracy of his beliefs 
about people or things. Trust should not be confused with reliance, which may often be substituted for 
trust. Reliance is a mechanism whereby one believes that the partner in a trust relationship can resolve 
a problem or conflict which may arise even when there is insufficient proof that risk has been reduced 
[7]. Trust relationships exist between individuals and other individuals, as well as between individuals 
and organizations or institutions. An individual may also have a level of trust in his own abilities or 
knowledge. Chu et al. evaluated the dangers of trust in their design for creating a secure application 
framework [8]. In their evaluation, they defined trust as follows: “Trust  is  to  undertake  a  potentially  
dangerous  operation  knowing  that  it  is  potentially  dangerous” [8]. They then proceeded to look at 
trust from an end-user’s vantage point, noting that in general a user will prefer to have some proof of 
harmlessness; however, they often accept weak forms of evidence in establishing trust. For example, 
they noted that if a piece of software is recommended by a friend whom they trust, other users are 
more likely to assume that software is safe even without an explicit mention of the software being 
“virus-free” or otherwise benign. They also noted that when responsibility can be transferred to another 
individual, group, or institution that individuals are more likely to put trust in an otherwise risky 
relationship or endeavor. They provided an example of using a credit card in a potentially insecure 
transaction because the credit card company will assume the liability for any fraud that could result in 
the future. 
In Dourish(1) et al.'s investigation of trust the researchers noted that people will often put their faith 
and trust in technology itself to provide protection [3]. In this case, humans will take on more risky 
behaviors because of their confidence in technology to protect them. That is to say a user may 
download an attachment from an unknown sender believing that if a virus were attached his virus 
scanner, spyware blocker, and other technology would prevent any harm. In the case of an IT 
professional, this blind faith in technology could be much worse. IT professionals who understand a 
given technology and how it works may be more prone to believing the provided safeguards are 
absolute as long as they are maintained and remain functional. As a result, IT administrators may not 
bother to make active decisions on security issues.  
The highest level of trust is often between individuals and established institutions. One may consider 
banks, for example, to be relatively secure because of their investments in security guards, heavy safes, 
and video monitoring technology. Dourish(1) et al. asserted that this trust is often transferred from the 
physical world to the bank’s online presence [3]. While it can be argued that banks are the biggest 
investors in security and security technology, they still remain lucrative targets for attackers. Such 
awareness is necessary for making accurate security related decisions. In terms of software, many 
popular download website have become institutions in their own right. Due to popularity and traffic, 
users may assume that others also trust these web sites without any actual foundation. In 2003, popular 
open source project management and repository Source Forge (http://www.sourceforge.net) was 
successfully attacked [9]. The root FTP servers used to host many of the projects repositories were 
compromised in the attack. It was unknown whether any files were compromised before the attack was 
discovered, but there was the possibility that malicious code could have been injected into any number 
of project repositories. Users would typically not think twice about downloading software from Source 
Forge because all projects are open source and anyone could review the code, and then alert the 
community or the Source Forge administrators of any vulnerability or danger. However, there are many 
unmaintained and unmonitored projects which users may still use without performing their own 
analysis. Users implicitly may feel safe because the content is hosted on Source Forge and that the 
source code is open for review, but hosting via Source Forge does not present any explicit security 
guarantee.  
4.3.5 Human Nature and Security 
Considering the above human decision making processes and factors which many increase or decrease 
trust, the way that individuals approach security practices and security decisions will now be addressed.   
Dourish(2) et al. sought to investigate how people view problems of security, with a desired outcome of 
discovering related mental models and conceptual arrangements [4]. According to the authors, security 
“rests in practice, and in the detail of what people do” [4]. Security should be viewed in the context of 
what is actually done on a system, not what assets should be protected. As mentioned earlier, humans 
make tradeoff-based decisions which often increase risk. For this reason, it becomes clear in their study 
that security does not exist in a Boolean context, rather security based decisions will fall somewhere on 
a continuum. Further findings in [4] indicate that retrospectively poor choices can be attributed to a lack 
of communication that exists between developers, implementers (such as acquisition decision makers), 
and users. End users often do not see software applications and their related security concerns the same 
way as knowledgeable IT professionals. As a result, users may not understand security mechanisms or 
their intended purpose. For example, a user may believe that a spam filter will delete malicious 
attachments, when in reality the organization's spam filters only perform basic pattern matching and 
normally would not scan for viruses or spyware. In addition, the Dourish(2) et al. study found there was 
a generational difference among users: Younger individuals were much more skeptical and concerned 
about potential security situations, whereas older individuals displayed a higher degree of trust. More 
broadly, their study highlighted that users believe their efforts to be secured are futile because the 
hackers, spammers, and other villains will always be a step ahead of them. Users therefore prefer to 
delegate responsibility elsewhere and believe they themselves are incapable or are not responsible for 
security within organizations.  
In a later article [3], Dourish(1) et al. confirmed many of their previous findings. Some new points were 
also raised in this study. The authors noted that as the complexity of software increases, users will tend 
to explore and seek to understand it less. This correlates to another finding which explains that while a 
user’s security decision will fall somewhere on a continuum, their choice to act or to not act is often all 
or nothing. For example, if a typical user is prompted to update the virus definitions for his virus scanner 
software, he will either do it immediately or will choose not to perform the update at all because he 
does not understand the purpose or need, or may simply have other tasks with a higher precedence. 
Usually, if the user does not immediately take care of the security concern, he will forget about it or will 
choose rather to just accept the security violation (e.g. spyware pop-up every few minutes) as part of 
normal computing operations. The authors also shared a novel observation that over time, security 
practices may become part of normal routine. While initially this would appear to be a positive gain, 
user complacency will lead to less conscious thinking of security and may also result in the users 
forgetting how or why a particular security task should be tackled. For example, when a new member 
enters a group the current group members are unable to explain the security procedures, practices, and 
principles to the new member. This may result in a decay of security over time as old members leave 
and new members join the group. 
Gross & Rosson provided an overview of their interview study which assessed user security practices [2]. 
The authors’ research indicated that there is increasing concern among users about security. However, 
in line with other studies [3][4], they noted that users are unable to understand and effectively 
implement security practices. An important concept raised in their research is that security in an 
ongoing process; there is no terminal goal or end point at which security can be ignored. Most users 
only concern themselves with security when it is obvious or a message pops up informing them of some 
security concern. Such intrusions result in users viewing security as a functional barrier; if a security 
breach occurred and prevented a user from using her systems, productivity would be stopped. This 
finding demonstrates that users do not typically concern themselves with security for security’s sake, 
but rather only consider it in correlation to achieving their normal tasks.  Also, Gross & Rosson observed 
the effect of interaction with IT staff on end-user security awareness and practice. When there is a high 
level of interaction among users and the IT staff, trust is increased and users are more likely to 
understand and respect the need for security practices. This finding does not address if the relationship 
varies if the IT services are outsourced as opposed to being provided in-house. 
4.3.6 The Weakest Link 
Much of the literature has identified humans as the cause of most security related issues, instead of 
poorly written software or inadequate procedures. This section will review some of the ways that 
humans defeat or limit security measures.  
As Sasse et al. discussed [5], regardless of capital investment in technology, security mechanisms are 
easily defeated (whether intentionally or not) due to human error or incompetence. In their study Sasse 
and her associates examined the effectiveness and success of password and authentication usage 
among end users. Their paper detailed that users often have great trouble remembering their many 
passwords due to factors such as complexity and frequency of usage. The results of their survey and in-
depth interviews further indicated that in general users did not display sufficient understanding of 
security practices or the importance of compliance. Through their study they hypothesize that users are 
typically not well educated about security and do not concern themselves with security for a number of 
reasons, such as those mentioned above. Most alarming is that participants indicated they did not 
believe they would be the target of an attack; some participants explained that they did not believe they 
had any sensitive information or that a security compromise on their system or account would not result 
in any further harm to the organization. However, from practical experience I argue that most attacks on 
a network or vital systems do in fact begin by compromising a poorly secured user system or account 
since they are often not as closely monitored as servers or administrator accounts.  
Users typically do not believe they have any responsibility for security. They choose to delegate the 
responsibility or trust in some external person, group, institution, or technology. Within an organization, 
users do not feel in direct danger. They choose to believe that the organization is the target; however, 
users seem unaware that the organization may store personal data in payroll and human resources 
databases. Should an attacker compromise these systems, the user could potentially be directly affected 
by the attack. Besnard & Arief observed that this mentality leads to activities such as writing down 
passwords or other convenience mechanism for circumventing security procedures [1]. It is unlikely that 
users seek to defeat security mechanisms for the sake of limiting security, but rather it is the result of 
convenience. As Besnard & Arief noted, there is a cost associated with any task and security measures 
often make the costs higher; by circumventing security users make their tasks less expensive either in 
terms of complexity or time.  
4.3.7 Software is Inherently Insecure 
Most software developers do not intentionally create faulty or insecure software. However, as noted in 
earlier sections, security adds additional costs and must always be ongoing. As a result, there is the 
inevitability that software will arrive for deployment with problems or security flaws, and furthermore 
that the initial authors were more concerned with efficiency and algorithmic elegance than with writing 
tight and secure code.  
In a paper Collins et al. examined the consequences of poorly designed and insecure software 
construction on end users [10]. They note there are many reasons that software can prove defective. 
While the software may be written to match specifications, that does not guarantee that specifications 
themselves are correct. Software may also be used in unintentional ways or combined with other 
applications in such a way that new security concerns are created that were not previously known. 
Collins and his associates recount a case study where an unknown bug existed in switches used by AT&T. 
The logical error was not detected in testing and the condition which triggered the failure was not 
common. In another case, the authors examined the implementation of electronic management system 
for hospital pharmacy. This case was interesting because apparent bugs were found, not by a 
programmer, but by a member of the hospital staff. This particular individual was highly skeptical of the 
system, and while she was not intentionally trying to break the system she was on high alert. Clearly, 
security must not only be evaluated during the initial purchasing procedure, but before and after 
deployment has occurred.  It is also important to remember that responsibility for security or privacy 
concerns fall on the organization deploying the software, not the software developer in almost all cases. 
While lawsuits can often be brought forward for contract software that does not meet standards, most 
commercial and open source software authors are not accountable. The text of most open source 
licenses or end user license agreements specifically indemnifies the author of legal responsibility. 
Sasse and her associates also noted that the design of security has an effect on security. Based on their 
findings [5], they noted that security increases when the application better matches the user’s 
workflow. This logically follows findings presented earlier because the cost of a particular task is not 
greatly increased by following a procedure that is well designed to accompany the task. As an example, 
consider a user work group where users work collaboratively on reports. A role-based, collaborative 
document management system would allow all users to have appropriate access to a file without the 
burden of managing access in a more traditional method such as controlled directories in a file system. 
Because the processes has become more easier and less costly than typical file management, the users 
would likely have no qualms about the added security.  
Shimeall & McDermott [11] examined Internet usage and related security concerns. They noted that 
software is becoming more complex, while at the same time application efficiency has taken precedence 
over security. As a result, there are complex systems with many points of failure, which are widely 
distributed and deployed, often with minimal security testing. Furthermore, they concluded that 
vulnerabilities will increase as programmers become more comfortable with sloppy coding procedures 
and usage of languages which require greater security considerations by the programmer. Take for 
example the PHP programming language. Because PHP is loosely-typed, data validation becomes 
extremely important when dealing with user input. However, it is not unlikely to find a piece of PHP 
code that expects an integer, accepts a string, and allows for a malicious code injection. For this reason, 
the authors stressed the importance of constantly reevaluating software through its lifecycle. Security or 
operational flaws may be discovered and patched, however, that does not guarantee that such patches 
will be applied or that the modification will not result in further vulnerabilities.  
4.3.8 What can be done to improve security? 
The most important conclusion brought about in the body of research, is that users are not well 
informed about security. To this end, Besnard & Arief provided recommendations and considerations for 
educating users about security. Note, education will not prevent all problems, but it will increase 
awareness among users and administrators. Combined with the more frequent interaction proposed by 
Gross & Rosson [2], this will facilitate communication and trust between users and administrators. Such 
interaction will increase the likelihood that a user will seek guidance on a security concern, rather than 
simply dismissing the concern and continuing on with his work. Secondly, users must be protected from 
themselves. The software should be selected or written to streamline the user’s workflow. Users should 
be presented with a minimal number of choices (e.g., menu-driven interface as opposed to a graphical 
interface). Specifically for security concerns, users should be given explanations in simple language and 
all security information should be automatically forwarded to the IT staff. In this way, the administrators 
will be aware of security concerns and can seek out the individual even if the user does not come 
forward or later ask about the security incident. Lastly, it is important to remember that users are 
typically not technically proficient with computers nor are they performing IT work. Security must be 
analyzed beyond technological concerns; this would include creating a security culture where actions 
such as writing down passwords are discouraged. As noted by Dourish(2) et al. [3], security should not 
be “transparent”, but rather it should be highly visible. By providing people with the means to 
understand security and the consequences of their actions, there is a higher probability of users 
complying with security measures and rules.  
4.3.9 The Administrators 
Since the research findings do indicate that users are truly the weakest link, one would hope that the IT 
professionals or decision makers would display a greater security understanding. One might also assume 
that they also take strong steps to insure security in an IT environment, and thus would reduce the 
impact of the weak links. The literature to this point does not have significant findings or studies on the 
security awareness of IT professionals. In my study I propose that often there is no lock at all due to 
poor security practices by the IT staff, and that IT professionals are susceptible to flawed and illogical 
conclusions and cost-based tradeoffs in the same ways as end-users.  
Findings by Dourish(1) et al. indicated that non-technical users do not perceive security in the same way 
as IT professionals [4]. For instance, the authors noted that often users group security and privacy 
concerns together, and place prime importance on issues of privacy over those of a more security 
nature. Since users are typically incapable of understanding security concerns the IT staff is always 
responsible. In a section labeled “Responsibilities of the software buyer”, Collins et al. asserted that the 
buyer is “most responsible for the intended use of the software” [10]. The buyer, who is typically also 
the decision maker, is responsible for learning the software or system's capabilities and limits. If users 
will be interacting directly with a program, then they must also be considered so that the decision is 
user-centric and takes into consideration workflows. Since the buyer is the one who is making the 
commitment to the software, the responsibility for usage and security lies with them and not the end 
users. Besnard & Arief commented that “security is not the end-user’s task” because security depends 
on where security lies on an organization's list of priorities [1]. "Good security" should be an 
organizational goal, not simply a goal of the IT staff. The concern for security must be important to the 
senior staff as well [2]. Logically, this should be the case since a system failure or security breach would 
result in loss of reputation and/or a stoppage of productivity. However, executives are faced with the 
same cost decisions that arise when considering security versus productivity. 
Issues of trust can also greatly affect the perceptions and decisions related to security by IT 
professionals. Based on findings by Besnard & Arief [1], users were found to be susceptible to misplacing 
their trusts. However, misplaced trust by decision makers could be much more costly to the 
organization. A decision maker that is under pressure or that simply trusts vendors or other non-
knowledgeable sources increases security risks for the entire organization. An individual may be swayed 
by commercial reviews, biased whitepapers, or online forums where the security of the application is 
not even discussed. Based on these positives, and lack of any known negative aspects, the IT 
professional may assume a higher level of trust than she should. Without furtherer research or testing, 
the organization may never learn they have insecure software. Besnard & Arief discussed the implication 
for users becoming complacent with technological protections. However, since a decision maker or 
other IT professional has a better understanding of the technology and what it does, the level of trust 
could be much higher, to the point where responsibility is transferred to the technology. For example, a 
System Administrator may setup software to use an automatic updating mechanism. His belief in the 
strength of the system may result in log files or actual systems never be audited for successful updates. 
However, it is imperative for the IT staff to be diligent about security, because the impetus for creating a 
culture of security will almost certainly not come from the users. 
As mentioned throughout the literature, the concern for security was minimal in the early days of 
organizational computing. This raises an additional problem that IT professionals may not be security 
conscious. In fact, as Besnard & Arief demonstrated [1], a low level of understanding or knowledge can 
lead to users choosing more convenient paths. An IT professional without significant training or 
knowledge in IT security may choose to focus on his conventional IT tasks with minimal concern for 
security. However, this is unacceptable as there is likely no other source in the group who will 
understand or take responsibility for security.  
4.3.10 Research and Analysis Methodology 
Research in this domain lends itself to a qualitative approach, though other researchers chose a mixed 
method approach to compliment their qualitative data. The main methods used in previous research 
studies have been interviews and case studies. This study addresses a technical problem as well as a 
management problem, with a strong foundation based on general psychological ideas. Previous research 
has shown that security is simply not a purely technical problem; by understanding the human 
motivations for security decisions we can better align business practices as well as technical 
specifications to increase security. Many existing studies have been undertaken by computer scientists 
who adopted a more psychological and behavioral science approach.  
In a study by Sasse et al. the authors examined how users deal with passwords and other authentication 
methods [5]. Their paper details four studies. In the first study they provided a questionnaire which 
gauged concerns such as how many passwords a given users typically maintains and asked participants 
to described recent security problems. The second study involved an analysis of how often users had 
their password reset. This data was useful in generalizing the frequency of issues. In the third study in-
depth structured surveys were performed in order to determine user attitudes towards security and 
passwords. The fourth study followed 32 participants usage of the authentication mechanism for a 
courseware system. 
Dourish(2) et al. used semi-structured interviews of end users and their usage of Internet technologies 
[4]. At the time of writing, they were reformulating the questions in order to perform more detailed 
interviews on a larger sample. The questioning was conducted with an ethnographic-style in order to 
focus on the social factors which affected security thinking. The results likely contributed to the 
interviews performed in their later work [3]. In this later set of findings, the authors explain that they 
used Grounded Theory to analyze the data. The Grounded Theory puts the emphasis on forming the 
theory based on the research process. The goal, the authors stated, was not to simply document what 
users do, but to characterize and “understand [the users’] experience of security at they encounter it” 
[3]. They argued that a quantitative approach was not appropriate at this stage since they were more 
concerned with what questions to ask rather than finding true and complete answers.  
Gross & Rosson provided an in-depth explanation of how they setup their interview based study [2]. Pre-
establish questions were the launching point and were general in nature. They looked for spontaneous 
thoughts, not narrow answers. The participants selected had significant work experience, access to 
sensitive data, and had no special training in security. There was some resistance to participate in the 
study by individuals. The authors noted that some were not confident in the guarantee of confidentiality 
and feared that their answers may result in disciplinary action from their organizations. I was surprised 
that no other literature indicated a resistance to participate considering that the topic could easily 
create feelings of uneasiness and discomfort. The authors continue to describe their approach as 
functionalist as opposed to interpretive. This approach influenced the current research because I was 
most interested in how the human factors of security play out in organizations and institutions.  
4.3.11 Literature Review Conclusions 
The body of research provides great insight into the many human factors which affect security. From the 
decisions people make, to the trust relationships individuals establish, many factors affect security in an 
IT environment. The current body of research holds a great wealth of insight into users. Building upon 
this base, I hoped to explore other factors which play into IT security in organizations. As people become 
increasingly dependent upon technology, there must be assurance and understanding of security. 
Beyond the security within the organizations, people become links in other chains of security, be it 
friends, families, clubs or organizations. By increasing security practices and understanding in the 
business world, security in less controlled environments (e.g., the home) may also be increased. Users 
do not operate the various aspects of their lives in vacuums. The file your brother sends to you gets 
forwarded as an attachment to your coworker, which ends up on the department file server, which ends 
up spreading a malicious virus to the entire enterprise. Therefore it becomes clear that the only way to 
prevent such a chain of events is to continue to conduct research and to educate users. 
The study of security is an important topic not only for IT professionals and for corporations, but the 
findings can help build the general body of research in the psychological domains. Through studying 
security researches can examine areas such as trust, accountability, education, and decision science. 
Examining these principles in action can contribute to studies of intergroup relationships and education. 
Furthermore, this research can help ensure the security of both organizations and individuals because 
organizations maintain a large volumne of information in their IT systems. This information may include 
organizational trade secrets and personal information of employees. This information will become safer 
and better protected by teaching IT professionals how to implement good security measures and how to 
relay security understanding to the non-IT members of the organizations. When security is better 
understood by all, the costs of security practices can decrease because administrators will choose better 
products and also develop clearer policies and procedures, which will lead to less confusion and stress 
for users. When users are educated and understand these principles they are more likely to make better 
decisions. Everyone’s security and productivity is increased when an organization's security chain is 
made of strong links. Combined with a strong lock provided by the decision makers and other IT 
professionals, it will become harder for attackers to break the security chain.  
 
4.4 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model for this research is organized as a series of cause and effect statements: 
1. A more thorough evaluation of IT components before purchase and integration into the greater 
IT system will reduce instances of future problems. 
2. Decision makers who consider security during acquisition can increase organizational security 
because they are aware of security requirements and possible vulnerabilities in their 
environment before an attack occurs. 
3. If management does not provide sufficient support and resources for IT security programs and 
actions then the IT decision makers will be limited in their ability to provide organizational 
security. 
4. If end-users are not well trained or do not understand the ramifications of risky IT-related 
behavior then the IT decision makers will be limited in their ability to secure the organization’s 
IT systems. 
5. If an organization lacks experience and understanding of IT security it will be unable to recognize 
and properly address any possible security concerns which may exist. 
6. The ability of IT decision makers to make an informed decision in the general context of 
acquisition is an indicator of their ability to plan and make informed decisions about 
organizational IT security concerns.   
5 Methods  
5.1 Study setting 
This study was conducted during the summer of 2009 (June-August). All participants in this study came 
from organizations that operated in the Rochester, New York, metropolitan area. The selected 
participants for this study were identified by their organization as appropriate persons who were 
involved in the IT acquisition process for their organization. All participating organizations identified 
themselves as small-to-medium sized organizations having approximately 20-1000 employees.    
5.2 Selection of study subjects   
5.2.1 Source (Sample Population) 
Research was constrained to the Rochester, New York metropolitan area. The organizations represented 
in this study, operate in various industries. The decision makers participating in the study were from 
various organizational ranks, dependent upon the particular organizational-structure of each 
organization.  
5.2.2 Participant recruitment   
Potential participants were identified through local area business organizations which provide support 
and networking services to local businesses, as well as the career services department at the Rochester 
Institute of Technology. After successfully engaging a representative from one of the above sources, I 
explained the research and provided them with a standard participation announcement in letter form 
(see Appendix 10.2) and asked them to forward this announcement to the appropriate organizations 
within their membership. In some cases, the representative instead provided me with a list of suitable 
participants because they preferred I contact each potential participant individually.  
Some additional attempts were made to recruit participants for this study. Using a business-listing 
database, companies that seemed to best fit the criteria of this study and were located in the Rochester, 
New York metropolitan area were filtered and contacted directly using the same announcement as the 
previous method (see Appendix 10.2). In addition, companies that had close working relationships with 
the Rochester Institute of Technology were identified and also contacted directly.   
5.2.3 Criteria for eligibility/exclusion 
The following restrictions were placed on an organization being represented in this study: 
1. The organization should define itself as small or medium sized with approximately 20-600 core 
employees. 
2. The majority of the core employees in this organization must interact with personal computers 
or other IT technology in their day-to-day work. 
3. The company may not be in the business of providing IT security solutions or building IT security 
products because they might have a skewed opinion on IT security compared to organizations 
that operate in other industries.  
5.3 Description of intervention 
In this interview-based study, there was no intervention. All participants were subject to the same set of 
questions and followed a similar interview process. 
5.4 Data collection  
5.4.1 Source   
All original research in this study was obtained through in-person interviews with the individual 
identified by the organization as an IT decision maker involved in the acquisition process. Each interview 
lasted between approximately sixty and ninety minutes. The interviews were all conducted one-on-one 
and the participants provided informed consent. The interviews were either located on the premises of 
the organization where the decision maker was employed or in a private study room in the Wallace 
Library at the Rochester Institute of Technology. The interview questions focused first on general 
procedures related to acquisition and the focused narrowed specifically to IT security at the end. At the 
conclusion of the interview, the participant was allowed to readdress any questions or provide any 
additional commentary related to the subject matter covered in the interview. In general, questions 
were asked in the same order for each participant, except in the case where the participant had 
provided sufficient material relevant to the question in response to a previous question or if the 
question was inappropriate for the participant (e.g., asking a CEO about how his boss communicates 
with him). The specific interview questions that contributed to this research are provided in Section 0 of 
this report. 
5.4.2 Protocol for typical participant  
After a participant was identified as suitable for this research study, an in-person interview was 
scheduled at the convenience of each participant. Before beginning the actual interview, the participant 
was provided an informed consent form (see Appendix 10.1) and the opportunity to opt-out of the study 
or ask additional questions. The participant was also informed that the interview would be recorded to 
assist in later analysis. After confirming informed consent, I proceed with the interview. A general 
outline-script was prepared with section introductions and the actual questions to be asked. The 
questions were scripted for consistency and all attempts were made to use the simplest language 
possible for each question. As each question was asked, some clarification was provided as needed or 
requested by the participant. The participant’s responses were recorded and notes were also taken for 
each response. After all of the planned questions were asked, the participant had the opportunity to add 
supplemental information or to readdress any subject material covered early in the interview. At the 
end of the interview, the participant was informed that the interview was over and the recording was 
stopped.  
5.4.3 Steps taken to assess and assure data quality  
To increase the probability of a truthful response from the participant, their confidentiality was ensured 
through the informed consent process. Moreover, the interview was structured to start with more 
innocuous topics gradually moving into areas where the participant may not necessarily be as 
comfortable. To this end, the study’s main focus was on the acquisition process in general, only focusing 
on security issues after first collecting responses in general. It was an initial consideration that 
participants may not be comfortable talking about poor security choices or lack of security knowledge. 
However, in the process of the interview all participants were comfortable admitting any shortcomings 
or lack of interest about security. 
In addition to transcribing notes during the actual interview process, the interview was recorded. This 
allowed for review where the notes transcribed were either unclear or where further review of the 
interview was required to address a particular question.   
5.5 Data Analyses 
5.5.1 Result Preparation and Analysis 
In order to address the research questions specified above several phases of analysis were conducted.  
The first phase of the evaluation involved organizing the participant findings to ensure that the interview 
as whole is considered in each question. This was necessary because sometimes participants address the 
material in certain questions before they were asked. Also in this phase, some questions (or groups of 
questions) were assigned a score. The score is ordinal and its primary purpose was to match similar 
answers among participants in order to discover if any trends exist. Some questions or groups of 
questions may not have any score attached to them; these questions, however, were used to see if 
there are any similarities amongst participants with similar responses on scored questions or to draw 
additional conclusions. Once each participant had a complete answer set that was scored (where 
appropriate) the first phase was concluded. 
The second phase involved evaluating all the responses for an individual participant to measure general 
attitudes and actions across all the questions in the survey. A summary of each participant highlighting 
any interesting responses, abnormalities, or other pertinent information is provided in Appendix 10.4. 
The last phase involves evaluation of any trends or common practices identified. This was the core 
analysis to address this thesis and explored contributing factors to well-founded decision making in 
acquisition and consideration of security related requirements and practices. From the study’s findings 
any available indicators or factors that affect the above can be identified and explored.  
5.5.2 Sample size/power considerations  
The sample of this study was 15 participants (  15). This sample size is inappropriate for most 
statistical methods and to make implied generalizations of the population. Population characterization 
was not a goal of this study; instead the study focused on analyzing the effect of certain decisions, 
attitudes, and behaviors on the decision makers' general and security decisions related to IT component 
acquisition. An attempt was made herein to identify individuals who hold common beliefs and practices 
and to group them together, however, there may be additional confounding variables not explicitly 
addressed in this study, which may become evident in larger samples. 
5.5.3 Statistical methods 
In this study the correlation between different factors were evaluated in order to provide possible 
explanations of a decision maker's ability to make a quality acquisition decision and to suggest 
explanations for the decision maker's level of security awareness and understanding. To accomplish this, 
certain questions asked of the participant were scored. Each question fell into a primary category as 
explained above. Correlation tests are applied to these scores in order to see if there are any significant 
relationships. In addition, linear regression tests are employed to evaluate if proficiency in one area 
predicts or explains a proportion of the variance between the score in different categorical relationships. 
Simple statistical methods were also used to evaluate and compare score quality in different categories 
in order to communicate to the reader the proficiency of the sampled participants. 
  
5.6 Interview Questions 
Table 1 provides a listing of the relevant questions asked during this interview and provides an 
identifying number which will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis report. A more in-depth 
explanation of each question is available in Appendix 10.3. Questions are organized by their primary 
section, however, please note some questions may have implications in other sections of the interview - 
please consult the appendix for further explanation. Also note that simpler language was used for each 
question during the course of the actual interview, but that the questions here are presented in a more 
formal matter to ensure clarity for the reader. 
TABLE 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
# Question 
 Section 1: Experience 
01 How many years have you been employed at this organization? 
02 Identify your job title and role; please describe your general day to day activities in this position. 
03 What is your educational background? Please include all post-high school degrees, certifications, 
are other notable educational experiences. 
04 Describe any ongoing professional education opportunities provided by your organization and your 
participation in such activities or conferences. 
05 How do you stay current with your profession? What sources provide you with your information? 
 Section 2: Acquisition Decision Strategy 
06 To what extent are acquisition activities planned? To what extent are they reactive or “spur of the 
moment”? 
07 Who are the people who identify the need to start acquisition activities or an acquisition project? 
08 Who are the people who decide to then actual begin acquisition activities? Who are the relevant 
decision makers in the acquisition process? 
09 How often do you do you participate in acquisition activities? 
10 Please define how you start acquisition process in your organization. Identify if the process is 
formalized or regular in any way. Identify the activities that occur in the early stages of acquisition. 
11 Define what constitutes a good (desirable) IT component in your organization.  
12 Are there any constraints placed upon the IT components you consider in acquisition, either from 
the organization or from your own criteria. 
13 Are there any common attributes in the IT components that your acquire for your organization? 
14 Describe the final stages of the acquisition process within your organization. Once you have 
selected the IT component to acquire what else must occur before moving into implementation? 
Who else is involved in this stage? Are any approvals required to acquire the component? 
15 During the acquisition process what factors or people inhibit the process? What, if any, are the 
sources for resistance of frequently occurring problems in the acquisition process? 
16 Once a product has been finally selected and approved what are the final steps to close out the 
acquisition process or prepare/bridge to implementation? 
17 Reflect upon a time when an acquisition project failed. Why do you believe the acquisition was a 




TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
# Question 
18 Reflecting upon the previous acquisition failure, please explain what was done to address the 
situation. 
19 How have (or will you) address your acquisition process in order to limit or prevent a reoccurrence 
of a similar incident? 
20 Who, including yourself, would decide that the acquisition process failed or that an acquired IT 
component was not meeting its intended purpose after implementation? 
 Section 3: Management Style and Organizational Factors 
21 Is your organization best described as hierarchically organized or are the boundaries more blurred 
in your organization? 
22 How strong is ownership of (information) assets in your organization? Do you believe that 
appropriate information generally flows easily across organizational borders? 
23 Describe the quality of communication between upper management and the rest of the company. 
24 Describe the quality and style of communication between yourself and upper management and/or 
your direct superiors. 
25 Describe the quality of communication between upper level decision makers and the IT department 
as a whole. Expand on the general interaction with upper management and their general interest in 
IT matters. 
26 In terms of management, who are the relevant decision makers in the IT acquisition process? What 
is their level of interaction with the acquisition activities? 
27 In your own opinion, would you say IT is important to the core operation of your organization? Do 
you believe that the organization’s success is directly related to the quality of the IT systems and 
components?  
28 Does upper management understand the impact and value of IT? To what extent is upper 
management involved or concerned about IT? 
29 Do you believe that the selection of one IT component over another has any appreciable impact on 
the organization if they all options meet the core needs? 
 Section 4: User Interaction 
30 Describe the range of end-user computer literacy within your organization (where do most users 
rank on a continuum from novice to expert). 
31 If among the end-user population, there are IT experts power-users do they attempt to provide 
input into the acquisition process? Do you appreciate this input and do you ever seek input 
specifically from this portion of the end-user population? 
32 In terms of the acquisition process, what considerations are made regarding end-users and how do 
you determine these considerations? What methods do you use in order to evaluate user-
acceptance of IT components? 
33 In terms of technical support, do you find that users are willing to ask for help? Do end-users 
regularly communicate system issues to the IT staff? 
34 Describe the level of acceptance for new IT components and systems in your organization. Do end-




TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
# Question 
35 In terms of your acquisition projects, to what extent do you gather input during the acquisition 
process? After the completion of the acquisition process, to what extent do you gather feedback? 
36 Describe the opportunities for end-user IT training in your organization. 
37 In terms of your acquisition projects, how are users prepared for the introduction of new systems. 
How far in advance are they notified of a system change and at what point would training (if 
necessary) begin? 
38 Was there ever a time that a user refused to accept a new IT component? What was done to 
address this issue? 
 Section 5: Security Considerations in the Acquisition Process 
39 Please describe management’s understanding of IT security concerns and their interest in this issue. 
40 In your organization, is security motivated by internal factors, external factors, or a combination? 
Please describe any sources of motivation to be concerned with IT security. 
41 Are you aware of any laws or regulations which affect the operation of your IT systems? 
42 Does your organization have formal security policies? If your organization does have formal 
policies, do the policies address any requirements of restrictions for components that may or may 
not be acquired? 
43 Do either formal computer usage or end-user security policies exist? If these policies exist either 
formally or informally, to what extent are they monitored and enforced? 
44 In terms of end-users and security, what security concerns exist in your organization? What tools or 
restrictions are in place to control end-user usage of IT systems? 
45 Do you believe that the security policies are well written and can be understood by end-users? Are 
the users aware of the existence of the security policies and are they conscious of the related 
obligations and restrictions? 
46 Do you yourself have any background or understanding of IT security? Describe your level of IT 
security competence. Are there other individuals besides yourself who are more focused on IT 
security and, if so, what role do these individuals play in IT acquisition. Do you believe that your 
organization would benefit from an increase in IT staff security training or personnel? 
47 Describe the role that IT security plays in your acquisition projects. Is security an important 
consideration when you are considering new IT components or systems? In your opinion, what 
exactly does security mean in the context of IT component acquisition? 
48 What measures beyond antivirus and firewalls do you consider fundamentally important to 
ensuring security of your IT systems? How does this philosophy affect software or system 
acquisition? 
49 From your acquisition experience, can you share any insight or provide any suggestions to increase 
total IT system security or to limit a decrease in total IT system security? In terms of security, are 
there any issues or concerns of which you would advise others to be weary? 
 Summary Question 
50 Do you have any additional comments or ideas about the role of IT security in the acquisition 




6.1 Scoring Criteria 
In this interview study, two types of questions were asked, scored and informational. Some questions, 
or groups of questions taken together, are assigned an ordinal score  out of a possible score  on that 
question or question group of questions, with 0 being the lowest possible value and  being the highest 
value. The possible scores are based upon predefined criteria that vary depending on each question or 
question group. For a full explanation of the scoring criteria for each question, please see Appendix 10.3. 
 
6.2 Participant Scores 
The following table provides the participant scores. Participants in this study are protected under 
informed consent, and will only be identified by a pseudo-random seven digit number, that was 
assigned randomly to each participant. 
  
 




























































































































               
                 
Q01 3 1 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 3 
Q02 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Q03 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 
Q04 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 
Q05 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 
Q06 3 NA 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Q07 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 
Q08 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Q10 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Q11 
2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 Q12 
Q13 
Q17 
3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 NA 3 Q18 
Q19 
Q22 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 
Q23 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q24 3 2 NA 2 NA NA 1 1 3 NA 3 1 3 3 3 2 
Q25 3 0 NA 2 NA NA 0 1 3 NA 2 2 3 3 2 1 
Q26 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 3 2 2 3 2 
Q28 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q29 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 
Q31 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 
Q33 2 2 1 2 2 NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q34 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 
Q35 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 
Q39 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Q42 3 1 0 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 0 2 3 2 
Q43 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 3 3 2 
Q45 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 0 3 3 2 
Q47 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 1 
  
6.3 Answer Summaries by Participant 
Please see Appendix 10.4 for summaries of the participants' responses. These responses can help the 
reader to understand the scoring and gives a general impression of the participant's though process and 
environmental factors. Specific and relevant results will be discussed in later sections, the Appendix is 
included for completeness or if the reader is interested in performing additional analysis on this data. 
Conclusions and trends will also be discussed in-depth in later sections.   
6.4 Security Scoring Analysis 
The following simple statistics summarize the sample population's scores on the security related 
questions. These tables are used in later analysis for characterizing the sample and for drawing trends. A 
basic explanation for each statistic will be explained at face value, more in-depth analysis follows in later 
sections where appropriate. 
6.4.1 Scoring on All Questions in the Security Section of the Interview 
 
TABLE 3: AVERAGES AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR ALL QUESTIONS IN THE SECURITY SECTION 
Mean Score 0.6769 
Median Score 0.6923 
Standard Deviation 0.2761 
 
Table 3 shows simple statistics for the security related questions of the interview. The mean average 
score is 0.68/1.00, which is relatively low and indicates that the organizations in the sample on average 
have mediocre security practices and attitudes. The median approximates the mean indicating that the 
scores are roughly divided around the mean. The large standard deviation indicates that there was a 
wide range of scores for this section of the interview. 
 
6.4.2 Scoring on Security Questions Directly Addressing Security during Acquisition 
 
TABLE 4: AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION ADDRESSING ROLE OF SECURITY IN ACQUISTION 
Mean Score 0.5733 
Median Score 0.6000 
Standard Deviation 0.3011 
 
Table 4 shows the simple statistics for the questions which security attitudes and practices specific to 
acquisition activities. The mean and median were lower than in security as a whole, which suggests that 
security is not widely considered during acquisition, this will be discussed in much greater detail in later 
sections. The large standard deviation also indicates there was a wide range of scores where there were 
some who scored very high and many who scored extremely poor. 
 
  
6.5 Correlations Analysis 
6.5.1 Correlations between various sections addressed in the Interview 
 
 
TABLE 5: CORRELATION STATISTICS COMPARING THE VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE INTERVIEW 
    Experience 
Decision 
Strategy Management Users Security 
Pearson Correlation Experience 1 -.202 -.008 .273 .263 
Sig. (2-tailed)  . .470 .976 .325 .344 
Pearson Correlation Decision 
Strategy 
-.202 1 -.527(*) .520(*) .559(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .470 . .044 .047 .030 
Pearson Correlation Management -.008 -.527(*) 1 -.003 -.468 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .976 .044 . .991 .078 
Pearson Correlation Users .273 .520(*) -.003 1 .401 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .325 .047 .991 . .138 
Pearson Correlation Security .263 .559(*) -.468 .401 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .344 .030 .078 .138 . 
N (Sample Size) = 15 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5 shows the correlation values between various sections of the interview. The correlations are 
calculated using the participants' sum scores in each category. Pearson's correlation test statistics were 
calculated using an alpha level of    .05. The most important relationship in the table is the significant 
correlation between security and decision strategy; 31% of the variance in participants' security scores 
can be attributed to their quality scores for decision strategy. These correlations will be analyzed in 
greater detail where appropriate in the later sections which address the specific research questions 
original presented in Section 4.2. 
 
  
6.5.2 Regression Results: Decision Strategy on Security  
 
  
TABLE 6: REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF DECISION STRATEGY ON SECURITY (SUMMARY) 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Sig. 
.559(a) .313 .260 .030(a) 
(a)  Predictors: (Constant), Decision Strategy 
 
Table 6 provides a summary of the statistics related to the regression calculation. Since there is only one 
independent variable being considered the r-Value and significance are the same as in the above 
correlation calculations. The relationship is significant at the   .05 level. 31% of the variance in scores 




TABLE 7: REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF DECISION STRATEGY ON SECURITY (EQUATION) 
  Coefficients Sig. 
(Constant) -.563 .293 
Decision Strategy 1.410 .030 
(a)  Dependent Variable: Security 
 
 
Table 7 provides the coefficient used to create the regression model equation and each coefficient's 
significance. For this relationship, the following model can be used to predict a participant's score on the 
security section of the interview based on the corresponding participant score on the decision strategy 
questions:  
       1.41   0.56  
6.5.3 Regression Results: {User Interaction and Involvement, Management Attitudes, and 




TABLE 8: REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF PREDICOTORS ON DECISION STRATEGY (SUMMARY) 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Sig. 
.822(a) .676 .588 .005(a) 
(a)  Predictors: (Constant), Users, Management, Experience 
 
 
Table 8 provides a summary of the statistics related to the regression calculation. The independent 
variables (predictors) are the participant's scores in the user interaction and involvement, management 
attitudes, and experience sections of the interview. The relationship is significant at the   .05 level. 
68% of the variance in scores in the decision strategy section of the interview can be explained by 




TABLE 9: REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE EFFECT OF PREDICOTORS ON DECISION STRATEGY (EQUATION) 
 Coefficients Sig. 
(Constant) 1.061 .000 
Decision Maker and Organization Experience -.337 .059 
Management Attitudes -.310 .011 
User Interaction and Involvement .407 .005 
(a)  Dependent Variable: Decision Strategy 
 
 
Table 9 provides the coefficient used to create the regression model equation and each coefficient's 
significance. The reader should note that management attitudes and user interaction are significant at 
the   .05 level, while experience is trending towards significant. For this relationship, the following 
model can be used to predict a participant's score on the security section of the interview based on the 
corresponding participant score on the decision strategy questions:  
   
    0.34 ! "#   0.31 ! $ 
 0.40 !  1.06 
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7 Interpretations & Analysis 
7.1 Research Question Q1 
7.1.1 Question Statement  
To what extent, if any, is security considered during the acquisition process?  
7.1.2 Interpretations and Analysis 
In this study, the fifth section of interview questions addressed security factors. Interview questions 42 
and 47 specifically address the participant's attitudes and consideration of security during the 
acquisition phase of the system development lifecycle (SDLC). The participants' scores on the individual 
questions can be found in Section 6.2 and a statistical analysis of these questions can be found in 
Section 6.4.2. 
Overall, security consideration was not high with a mean score of 0.57/1.00. Close to half of the 
participants (7/15) had a score below the average, while three participants scored 1.00/1.00. The lowest 
two scoring participants were #3103141 and #7008146; these participants also scored within the 
bottom quartile for all questions in the security consideration category and they scored in the bottom 
quartile when all question scores in the study were summed together. Only one-third of the 
participants' scores were above 0.80/1.00.  
In general, even when participants mentioned that management was aware of security concerns or that 
they were concerned about security issues, there was no immediate concern for defining security 
requirements or considering security issues during the acquisition process. There is a significant 
correlation (r=0.70, p=0.004) between participants' scores on the questions about security during 
acquisition and the scores on the other questions in the security section which address security more 
broadly, suggesting that those who are more aware of security needs during acquisition will show more 
concern for security throughout the SDLC.  
Three participants (#3235679, #5350582, #5566166) scored 1.00/1.00 on these questions. Participant 
#3235679 is the IT decision maker for a financial services organization which is subject to very strict 
compliance requirements, and thus he identified security and compliance as a major part of his 
position's daily requirements. Participant #5350582 does not work in a highly regulated industry, but in 
a previous role he was a security auditor. This participant also noted that a large percentage of his time 
is devoted to acquisition activities. Participant #5566166's organization was also subject to compliance, 
and noteworthy from other participants, this participant was highly aware of the many laws and 
regulations which impact security requirements for his organization.   
The two lowest scoring participants (#3103141 and #7008146) generally did not believe they were at 
risk and did not see the value in analyzing security concerns. For interview question 47, participant 
#3103141 commented that security is not often talked about or addressed. The participant also noted 
that he believes consultants only talk about security as a fear-based motivation to buy a product. 
Participant #7008146 noted that he actively tries to encourage an environment with loose security and a 
high degree of open access; therefore it would be counterintuitive for him to look for aspects of a 
component which may increase security. Furthermore, this participant stated that he believes most 
acquisitions would not likely have any significant security repercussions. He further described his 
organization's security policies as weak and useless.  
Within the general sample population over half (8/15) of the participants scored 0/3 or 1/3 on interview 
question 42, which indicates that they either have no security policies, the security policies are weak, or 
the policies, if they exist, have no impact on security and/or would not be actively considered during the 
acquisition process. Less than on third (4/15) had security policies or rules which influence and affect 
whether a component could or could not be acquired.  The remainder of the participants in the sample 
did not have an explicit relationship between security policy and acquisition; however, they were aware 
of their security policies and requirement, and they noted that they do consider security during 
acquisition.  
While interview question 42 evaluated security in regards to the acquisition procedures, interview 
question 47 evaluated the participants' attitude towards security outside of actual requirements or 
policies. In this sample, over half (9/15) of the participants indicated that security was not considered at 
all or that when it was considered it was not an important factor in the decision making process. The 
remaining participants in the sample (6/15) did indicate that security was an important consideration 
and that their impression of a component's security quality would actively affect their choice to acquire. 
For example, participant #9892105 indicated that security was only important to the acquisition decision 
if it was outlined in the business case provided by the business unit, and that absent of these 
requirements in the business case, there would be no consideration. Other participants noted that 
security was considered, but not important because they believed there was a low probability of attack. 
Common justifications cited included perceptions that they were unlikely targets or that there already 
existed significant technological controls (e.g., firewalls) and measures for security so that security did 
not need to be evaluated on a per-component basis. Those who did believe that security was an 
important consideration during acquisition expressed concerns for the effect new components would 
have on the existing security controls as well as changes to how users would interact with the system. 
Those who scored higher on this question generally understood that the introduction of a new 
component would result in other systemic changes – both to technology as well as policies, processes, 
and procedures.  
Small businesses typically do not perceive a high level of outside threat; this perception, however, can 
lead to a lower consideration of security. In addition, this indicates that many small businesses have a 
very narrow understanding and definition of security. In this study, very few participants identified 
business continuity and disaster recovery related security concerns. Perimeter and boundary security, 
with which participants were most familiar, have little effect on protection and mitigation of threats 
from natural disasters. In addition, very few participants identified the possibility of insider threat and 
stated high skepticism about the possibility of insider attacks when directly questioned. 
With a narrow understanding of threats and limited definitions of security requirements, it is easy for a 
decision maker to accept, and even foster, seemingly anti-security attitudes and practices. As a result, of 
limited consideration of security and unrealistic perceptions of risk, most decision makers did not 
demonstrate an appropriate, and in some cases not even minimal, interest in security and it was often a 
low priority during acquisition and in general throughout the system lifecycle. In reality, small businesses 
are lucrative targets for external attackers because their security controls are weak and the IT staff (if 
any) will likely not possess the security background, time, and resources to actively stop or notice an 
attack. While an attack on a larger organization may have a higher possible reward, the risk of attacking 
a small business is much lower. In reality according to a study by Ryan [12], small businesses are not any 
less likely to be attacked compared to larger businesses.  
Those small businesses which do not properly address security during acquisition are more likely to be 
successfully attacked. This applies to both internal and external attacks. Some participants described 
their IT environment as fairly open with minimal (if any) restrictions. As a result, it may be very difficult 
or impossible to trace the route of information leakage, information exposure, or system vulnerability 
exploitation. As security becomes a more popular industry buzz word and regulations increase 
companies which do not consider security during acquisition will face difficult challenges moving from 
an open environment to a secure environment. Because security is not considered an important feature, 
components may need to be replaced that fail to provide adequate data and system protection. This can 
result to disruption of daily business activities and processes because systems must be taken offline 
temporarily or replaced. In addition, the time spent on the initial acquisition will be lost since the 
process will need to be repeated when new security criteria are added. Because of the relative lack of 
interest in security, it will require a large amount of retraining or outside assistance to make these 
decisions and implement the required security.  
Conversely, small businesses that have a higher consideration of security in the acquisition process tend 
to also have a better understanding of security in general. In this study those who scored highest on 
interview question 47 indicated that they understood the impact of their acquisition decisions on both 
systems and end-users. Because they are more aware of the impact of their decisions, they are less 
likely to choose a component which will later need to be replaced because of lack of functionality, 
security, or user acceptance. When an organization has formalized policies regarding acceptable security 
criteria for acquisition it indicates that decision makers have thoroughly considered the impact of 
security on the operation of its core business. By employing a proactive strategy the organization proves 
that it has evaluated possible threat scenarios and can also meet regulatory compliance. While not 
directly a security threat, insufficient compliance with regulations can result in large fines or the 
stoppage of business; thus, it is important to ensure that all systems meet compliance in order for a 
business to operate most efficiently. Formal guidelines for acquisition, security-wise and in general, can 
help reduce the likelihood of selecting a component which is not compatible with the company's existing 
infrastructure, procedures, and processes.  
  
7.2 Research Question Q2 
 
7.2.1 Question Statement 
To what extent, if any, is security considered by the participants and their corresponding organization 
throughout the system lifecycle? What is the extent of security awareness and understanding? 
7.2.2 Interpretations and Analysis 
In this research study, interview section 5 (interview questions 39-49) addressed security practices and 
attitudes of the study participants and their perceptions of security attitudes throughout their 
organization. While the decision makers are ultimately responsible for the final component selection, 
their decision making processes may be impacted by the attitudes and practices of others. In this study, 
two other broad groups of influencers were identified. The first group was members of upper/executive 
management, who set organizational policy and may approve a decision maker's selection. The second 
group consisted of end-users because they often interact directly with IT systems and components. The 
participants scores on the individual questions can be found in Section 6.2 and a statistical analysis of 
these questions can be found in section 6.4.1. 
Overall, organizational security awareness and understanding was not high in this sample with a mean 
score of 0.68/1.00 in this section of the interview. One third (5/15) of the participants had a score below 
the mean; however, almost one-third (4/15) had a score above 0.90/1.00. Two participants scored 
1.000/1.000 (#3235679 and #5350582). The two lowest scoring participants (#3103141 and #8486532) 
also were in the lowest quartile for total interview score.  
Interview question 39 asked the participant to respond on management's attitude towards security and 
their understanding of security concerns that may impact the business. Only one participant responded 
that management had no interest in security, while four indicated that management was aware of 
security concerns but it was not of prime importance. The remainder of the sample (10/15) did indicate 
that management was aware of IT security issues and gave such security consideration sufficient 
attention. The participant (#5758430) who responded that management does not think about security 
noted that management prefers as much openness as possible and that increased security restrictions 
and practices anger members of management. However, the participant did personally believe that 
security is important and therefore he limits management's involvement in security issues when 
possible. In this participant's organization, management's attitudes may be the cause of paltry security 
policies and may limit necessary funding for security related projects. 
Interview questions 40 and 41 asked participants to explain internal and external motivations for 
security, including laws and regulations. The most common motivations identified by participants were 
external, specifically regulatory compliance or external-client demands. The external motivators seemed 
to be very strong driving factors with one participant noting that management would probably not care 
about IT security in the absence of compliance requirements. Interestingly, client requirements were a 
much stronger motivator than direct regulatory compliance. This may be because clients usually specify 
narrower requirements than regulatory laws. Few participants expressed internal (from within the 
organization) motivations for security. Internal motivators identified usually fell into the following broad 
categories: due diligence or IT team pride; protecting corporate intellectual property; and protecting 
customers. Only 6/15 participants identified internal motivations, while all expect one participant 
identified external motivations.  
In the United States, regulatory compliance is complicated and as evidence by this study, very few 
participants were certain of all laws with which they were required to comply. One participant noted 
that there is no clearinghouse or agent who tells an organization what regulations may affect it. Some 
participants did not believe any laws affected them either because of their size or their industry (e.g., 
not medical or financial). For example, participant #3103141 believed that his organization was too 
small and that because of the type of business they conducted, that no sensitive customer information 
was held by the organization. However, in the same statement he indicated that they do maintain 
customer contact and billing information, which should be considered sensitive information. When 
asked if the organization only performed cash transactions, the participant indicated that the 
organization also processed credit-card transactions. The participant was in a senior management 
position, but was unaware of his organization's obligations under Payment Card Industry (PCI) 
Compliance. Regardless of company size or number of transactions performed, all processors are 
required to comply [13]. Interestingly, some organizations chose to follow regulatory guidelines for 
regulations to which they were not required to comply; participants explained that customers associate 
certain regulations with them because of their industry, and thus they take measures to comply in order 
to increase their legitimacy with clients.  
Interview questions 43-45 were concerned with the relationship between end-users and security 
concerns. In general, users are adverse to security policies and technical controls because they impede 
one's ability to complete a task in the most straightforward and simple manner. Users represent two 
major types of threats to IT systems. The first threat type is disruption of normal service, which means 
that a user's action may cause data to be lost or cause a system to fail. The second type of threat is that 
a user may (unintentionally or maliciously) access and expose confidential data or introduce unknown 
systems or components into the IT infrastructure whose affect on the system is unknown and 
unanticipated. As a result, it is important to take efforts to mitigate such activities through policy, 
technical controls, and monitoring in order to ensure that the IT systems continue to operate normally 
and that sensitive organization and customer information is protected. 
In response to interview question 43, almost half (7/15) of the participants demonstrated that they had 
security policies which specifically addressed end-user usage of IT systems and that there was sufficient 
oversight, monitoring, and enforcement of these policies. The remainder of the participants in the 
sample either had weakly defined policies (4/15) or only very informal policies and ideas about end user 
security (3/15). Only one participant indicated that there were no end-user security policies and that 
end-users were simply trusted to do the right thing without guidance. Complementing question 43, 
interview question 45 asked participants if they felt that users understood the existing security policies 
and controls and additionally if they believed end-users understood their obligations in regards to IT 
security. The majority (9/15) of the participants believed that the users understood the policies, that 
they were well written, and that users tended to follow the policies. Some participants indicated that 
employees were required to sign agreements of understanding as a condition or employment. Only two 
participants clearly indicated that users were highly aware and truly understood their needs. Some of 
those who indicated that users did not often follow, that users were not aware, or that any such policies 
were weak or non-existent (6/10) noted that they wanted to improve user training and awareness, but 
were limited by resources or organizational attitudes. There were some participants who believed that 
any such policies or user controls were unnecessary or unwanted because they trusted their users 
and/or they promoted a high level of open access. However, this is a flawed perspective because access-
control systems and policies do not prevent information sharing, they merely control it.  
Interview questions 44 and 48 address the specific controls and techniques used to monitor and control 
user access. In this study, the participants seemed to have a basic grasp on perimeter security controls, 
such as firewalls, as well as simple anti-virus protections. The next most common form of security 
controls employed were encryption of devices and transmissions, though this was not used by all 
organizations in this study. The use of granular access controls such as role-based access were the next 
common security practice; yet, some participants reported that they avoid such mechanisms in order to 
provide more open access and cross-role information sharing, with some claiming that implementation 
would be too difficult.  
In this sample, the main focus was on protection at the system level with application level and data level 
protections being much less common. Some participants noted that at least some of their data did not 
require any protection. When participants made this assertion it often seemed to be based upon their 
own opinion, not that of management or the business unit which owned the data. Even if data is in the 
public domain it should still be controlled through role based access, but with global access. Some 
participants commented that it was very difficult or impossible to prevent users from accidently 
transmitting data in unapproved forms such as email. However, this may be limited with technical 
controls, policy, and reminders built into the application. 
While all users identified at least some minimal level of controls, less than one-third (4/15) of 
participants identified using accounting and auditing procedures or practices. Auditing, whether internal 
or external, was not very common in the sample nor was review of logs or system reports. Some 
participants had managed (outsourced) security solutions and were not aware of any details about the 
protections and how they functioned; one participant noted that the company provides reports, but 
that he does not regularly review or monitor these status updates. It was assumed that the provider 
would take appropriate action. In general, it was clear that these organizations had varying levels of 
control and protections; however, it is not prudent to score them on the level or types of controls for 
two reasons. First, every organization has different needs and levels of acceptable risk. Furthermore, 
without the proper internal background or understanding it is not guaranteed that the organization 
properly configured and continues to maintain these controls or that they could sufficiently comprehend 
or evaluate managed provider reports. 
While the above questions have addressed influence and attitudes, it is also important to evaluate the 
experience level specific to IT security concepts. It is not requisite that the decision maker is an expert 
per se; however, there must be an internal resource or accessible and security-minded consultant who 
can provide qualified input from the security perspective. In interview question 45 the participant was 
asked to explain their own security education and experience as well other sources of security 
information from within the organization or through consultants.  
Almost half (7/15) of the participants indicated that they did not have any significant training or 
background in security and that they did not retain anyone internally or externally whose job role had a 
significant focus on security. Many of the participants in this grouping did not believe that they needed 
to increase their security background or training. Furthermore, they did not believe that it was 
necessary to devote their own time or anyone else's time to IT security related activities for any 
significant amount of time. There were a few individuals who had a background in security or had a 
previous role in the IT security field. While those individuals with experience demonstrated a greater 
understanding of security, prior experience was not an indicator of increased security consciousness and 
consideration. Participant #8486532 has a previous role as a security administrator, yet he actively 
encouraged an open environment and had only minimal concerns related to IT security overall. Those 
participants which indicated they frequently relied upon external consultants for their IT needs noted 
that their consultants did not often offer security solutions, with one participant, #3103141 expressing 
that he believed his consultants only mentioned security solutions as a scare tactic to make a sale.  
For the most part the participants in this study demonstrated that there was some level of security 
consideration in place. However, security measures were often limited to perimeter protection and 
system level access controls. In the sample population, very few participants gave the impression that 
they had truly thought about their organization's specific security needs as opposed to providing 
"standard" security controls. This was apparent by the frequent anti-security attitudes demonstrated 
that included blindly trusting users and encouraging an open-access environment. While security was on 
most participants' radars, most organizations did not devote significant time or resources to security. 
This cannot be attributed to the size of the company as there was no trend correlating company size to 
security awareness and understanding. Rather it seems that most organizations do not have an 
objective view of their security needs that includes identification of possible threats and their relative 
cost of exploitation versus cost to mitigate or prevent. Without an understanding or background of IT 
security needs and objectives it is impossible to objectively or empirical claim that an organization's level 
of security is sufficient. Simply, an organization is only secure if it is prepared to accept the exploit of all 
vulnerabilities it has not already mitigated. The above findings suggest that the average small business is 
ill-prepared to face security challenges.   
  
7.3 Research Question Q4 
7.3.1 Question Statement  
Does the relative quality of decision makers' decision strategies significantly predict the level of security 
awareness and understanding demonstrated by the participants and their organization? 
7.3.2 Interpretations and Analysis 
In this study the interviews questions in section 2 addressed the quality of the decision makers' decision 
strategy and the questions in section 5 addressed the level of security awareness and understanding. 
Each participant received a score out of all applicable questions for each section. The results of each 
scored question or question group can be found in Section 6.2. These scores were then statistically 
analyzed using regression testing and correlation studies to investigate the relationships between 
participants' performance in each category. The results of these statistical analyses can be found in 
Section 6.5.1 and Section 6.5.2. 
The results of this study suggest that there is a significant predictive relationship (  
    1.41   0.56) between a decision maker's decision strategy quality and 
her level of security awareness and understanding. In addition, there is a significant correlation between 
participants' scores in these two sections of the interviews (r=0.56, p=0.03). 
In Section 7.1 and Section 7.2, it was shown that the results of this study suggest that small businesses 
do not invest significant time or resources into security during acquisition or security more broadly 
throughout the SDLC. This research question therefore evaluates a possible explanation for the low level 
of security consideration and awareness in the small businesses. By increasing proactive consideration 
of security factors a decision maker can mitigate or prepare to accept a security violation in the future. 
The costs to make changes to an information system after acquisition are high because once a 
component is implemented other components and processes may have already become dependent. 
Therefore, effective acquisition decision strategy must necessarily entail an evaluation of future needs 
and requirements. As organizations become more aware of security issues and place an increased 
emphasis on increasing security measures, they are apt to investigate what changes can be made in 
order to reach this goal. Because of the correlation between security awareness and decision strategy 
quality, organizations wishing to improve or establish their security programs should start be evaluating 
and improving their acquisition decision strategies.  
In this study, some participants could not adequately define how they go about their acquisition process 
or what qualities and characteristics are desired in a component. Without some common criteria, 
decisions are less likely to consider the impact on the total system or on the business case in question. 
While a formal plan or worksheet is not required, one should strive to use consistent, objective criteria. 
An acquisition decision strategy should include an appropriate research effort using qualified and 
objective sources, where the information comes from a qualified professional or technical researcher. A 
solution or set of options should then be evaluated for functionality, effect on organizational processes, 
and effect on other IT systems. This may include internal validation and testing as well case study 
analysis and proof of concept from the solution provider. Lastly, beyond the component itself it is 
necessary to evaluate the solution provider, solution vendor, and all human resources to ensure that 
problems will be addressed in a satisfactory manner during implementation and for long-term support if 
desired.    
In addition, the acquisition phase is the least costly place to introduce new security measures because 
changes to systems and processes are already imminent. Security is often difficult or impossible to 
implement after a component has been integrated into an organization's IT infrastructure. As a result, 
even if an organization desires to improve security the possible options may be limited especially if the 
acquisition decision was made hastily and was not performed with proper evaluation and forward-
thinking consideration. A proactive approach to security begins in the acquisition phase. If a decision 
maker is not considering more mundane details during acquisition, it is very unlikely that they would 
consider more complex criteria such as security considerations. It is therefore not surprising to see the 
significant positive correlation between participants' decision making quality and their level of security 
awareness and understanding.   
 
  
7.4 Research Question Q3 
7.4.1 Question Statement  
Does the relative performance of decision makers (and their organizations) in the areas of experience, 
management attitudes, and user interaction significantly predict quality of decision making? 
7.4.2 Interpretations and Analysis 
In this study the questions in interview Sections 1, 3, and 4 addressed the relative experience, 
management attitudes, and user interaction levels of the participants and their corresponding 
organizations. Section 2 of the interview addressed the quality of the participants' decision making in 
regards to acquisition. Each participant received a score out of all applicable questions for each section. 
The results of each scored question or question group can be found in Section 4.3. These scores were 
then statistically analyzed using regression testing to investigate if there was a significant relationship 
between experience, management attitudes, and user interaction and the participant's quality of 
decision making. The results of the correlation analysis can be found in Section 6.5.3. 
The results of the participants scores and the regression analysis in this study suggest that a decision 
maker's quality of decision making can be predicted by her degree of experience, the attitudes of 
management within her organization, and the relationship between end-users and the members of the 
IT organization. The most influential category is the participant's interaction with end users (For a full 
breakdown and the regression equation refer to Section 6.5.3). There is also a significant correlation 
between participant's scores in the decision strategy section and the end-user interaction categories as 
calculated in Section 6.5.1, while the scores in the experience and management categories were not 
found to be significant in this study. 
It has already been suggested above that small businesses do not demonstrate a high level of security 
awareness and that there is a connection between security awareness and understanding and the 
quality of acquisition decision making. Continuing the regress argument, in order to improve acquisition 
an organization may be interested in factors which will lead to more successful acquisitions and 
acquisitions strategies. In this study, there was found to be a significant correlation between decision 
strategy and the quality of end-user interaction and end-user involvement in the acquisition process. To 
a lesser degree management attitudes and experience also affected acquisition decision quality, which 
surprisingly have a negative effect on decision quality. The findings in this research study do not suggest 
any reasons to explain this counter-intuitive relationship.  
The regression model suggests that one way to improve the quality of acquisition decision making is 
through increased end-user interaction and involvement. When decision makers take into account the 
business users of components, there will be a stronger alignment between technical needs and business 
objectives. Because end-users are the ones who are propelling the day-to-day operations of business, 
new components should best enable them to complete their tasks (where best is defined by the goals of 
management and possibly efficiency, creativity, or some other goal). Without user involvement, IT 
decision makers may not understand how certain features or processes can positively or negatively 
impact the end-user ability to complete tasks. In addition, it is often desirable to have a business user of 
the component serve as a subject matter expert and liaison to the IT support group. The establishment 
of such an individual can help translate between business problems and technical solutions. 
User involvement can also have an impact on security and security consideration. Security should be 
driven by the business case. Information or other assets have some value or legal requirement to be 
protected. Once a value on an asset is established an IT decision maker can decide how much effort 
should be invested in protecting that asset. With this knowledge, security is better aligned with strategic 
value as opposed to security simply for the sake of being more secure. While it may fall to the IT decision 
maker to asses this value, in most cases the IT staff are only asset custodians and not asset owners. With 
user involvement, asset value and related protection strategies can be assessed with a more solid 
foundation. By nature end-users are interested in completing tasks in the most straight forward manner. 
In almost all cases, security complicates any task and as a result end-user may suffer from reduced 
productivity or may circumvent security measures. By increasing end-user involvement, end-user are 
more aware of the value security brings compared to its inconvenience. Without interacting with end-
users, it may be very difficult for a decision maker to determine how security controls can have the least 
impact on the execution of business tasks.  
  
This page intentionally left blank.  
8 Discussion  
8.1 How key findings compare or contrast with previous work  
In the current body of research, too great an emphasis has been placed upon poor end-user practices in 
regards to security. This implied that sufficient security programs existed, that they were actively 
enforced, and that users were aware of their security obligations. In the case of small-to-medium sized 
business, this research suggests that for the most part there are often no programs or policies, and in 
some cases very limited security controls in place. Instead, the research findings herein contain many 
examples demonstrating a lack of interest or an outright resistance to practical or appropriate security 
measures. It is highly inappropriate to place the blame for poor user behavior on the users themselves 
when those who are responsible for maintaining and implementing security have put forth no effort. As 
the custodians of data and systems, it is the IT team and IT decision makers' responsibility to mitigate 
poor user behavior or to make it too costly and difficult to circumvent security mechanisms or to 
practice insecure data handling procedures. When an organization does not have firm security policies 
or does not actively enforce compliance there is a little incentive for the end-users to take security 
measure into their own hands. 
As suggested by previous research cited in the literature review, user involvement, education, and 
control are key to security. Without proper policies or education users may have no interest in security. 
However, by involving users in the acquisition phase there is a better understanding of the business 
process for which the component being acquired will be utilized. As a result, IT decision makers will be 
more aware of how data is shared, stored, and transferred. With this knowledge, appropriate security 
mechanisms can be selected to facilitate proper access and auditing to ensure that the users will not 
circumvent security guidelines in order to complete business tasks. In addition, this research found that 
when users were more involved in the acquisition process there was a higher rate of communication, 
and in some cases there was an establishment of a subject matter expert within the business 
organization. This individual could act as a liaison for support and may also be the business owner of the 
application. Previous research had indicated that poor communication leads to confusion and decreases 
security. The current research suggests that increased communication between end-users, IT decision 
makers, and vendors increases the quality of acquisition. Increased communication and research 
increases one's acquisition quality score and those with a higher quality score are more likely to consider 
security as criteria during acquisition. As a result, the research suggests that the opposite is also true – 
that an increase in communication can lead to better security. 
8.2 Implications of findings  
The findings of this study suggest that IT decision makers are in fact the lock in the IT security chain. 
Businesses which have poor security practices and programs are often simply not interested in security 
or they have not adopted a proactive approach to security. A high level of security awareness and 
consideration overall is correlated with an acquisition decision strategy which is based upon thorough, 
objective research and systemic impact analysis. IT decision makers who understand how to evaluate a 
component's technical and business needs will more likely choose systems which provide the most 
system-wide value. Conversely, IT decision makers who do not put sufficient consideration into 
acquisition have very little chance of identifying security need proactively and therefore will not be able 
to provide the appropriate or desired level of security for their organization. 
For many years, security has had little, if any, importance in IT decision making. However, because of 
ever-increasing government and non-government regulation, as well as customer expectations, security 
is becoming hard to ignore. While many small businesses may not believe they are at risk of attack, they 
may lose competitive advantage or suffer regulatory punishments for failing to meet security 
requirements. As a result, it will become increasingly important for organizations to secure their IT 
security chains. To meet both internal and external security demands, it will become increasingly 
important for IT decision makers to make thorough analyses of components which are added to an 
organization's IT infrastructure. Quality decisions are not dictated by experience, as many may presume, 
but by perseverance and due diligence. When decision makers use objective, qualified input in their 
decision making process and carefully consider business objectives and needs they can ensure 
acquisition success. In this study, some decision makers could identify common criteria and 
methodologies used in their acquisition process. For these individuals, it would be simple to add in one 
more set of criteria or to create an appropriate policy addressing these issues. However, in other 
organizations there were relatively few policies or guiding criteria. As a result, such organizations carry 
out acquisition and security haphazardly and inconsistently.   
Therefore, this research suggests that in order to meet increasing security demands and requirements it 
is necessary for IT decision makers to become experts in the acquisition process itself. Success in 
acquisition is highly dependent upon awareness, and not (as suggested by these findings) expertise or 
even managerial support. A decision maker must be aware of both technical and business requirements 
for any given component and how various solutions will impact both technical system interactions and 
business processes. These qualities are also paramount to any security program. In security is important 
to understand what constitutes an asset, what is the value of that asset, and what, if any, are the 
appropriate or necessary steps to mitigate that risk. During acquisition, IT decision makers who are 
performing a thorough analysis will be asking many of the same questions which would be of interest to 
a security implementer. This valuable information includes what systems exist, what data is on these 
systems, and which individuals or other systems interact with the data on that system.  
Failure to ensure quality acquisition in an organization will not negate increasing pressure for improved 
security. Instead, organizations with poor acquisition practices will find themselves hastily implementing 
unplanned or untested solutions to provide the required level of security. In the case of regulatory 
noncompliance, business operations may be halted entirely until the proper changes are made. At that 
point, the financial costs will be very high and there may be insufficient internally understanding from a 
combined business and technical perspective in order to find an expedient solution to the security 
requirements. In addition, there is also the increased likelihood of attack. Because the acquisition efforts 
did not likely take into account the impact on processes or other systems, there is an increased 
likelihood that new vulnerabilities were created either technical or through user circumvention. If 
security was not considered at the time of acquisition, it would be costly and difficult, if not impossible, 
to introduce security controls after implementation. It is also unlikely that the motivation to address 
these concerns would later materialize.  
8.2.1 For the theory or conceptual model described in the Introduction.  
The study suggests that the conceptual model presented earlier has both strengths and weaknesses. The 
research suggests that there is in fact a significant correlation and relationship between the depth and 
quality of acquisition in an organization and the level of security awareness and understanding. In 
addition, those participants who made security an integral part of their acquisition activities 
demonstrated a higher level security awareness, were more familiar with their own organization's 
security needs, and better understood security technology and terminology. The results of the study did 
not provide sufficient input to validate or invalidate whether or not there was a relationship between 
the quality of acquisition and reduction in component failure or defect. However, the research does 
suggest that those with a more thorough and higher quality acquisition strategy used strategies to 
mitigate future problems whereas those with weaker strategies did not often consider the possibility of 
component failure or the component failing to properly provide the functionality expected. End-user 
interaction and involvement in the acquisition process had the greatest positive influence on the quality 
of acquisition whereas the data suggests that the quality of acquisition was not improved by increased 
technical and organization experience or by increased involvement and/or support for management. 
The research does not provide conclusive evidence to explain the effect of management factors or 
experience directly on the level of security awareness and implementation.  
8.2.2 For future research 
In this research, the findings suggest that there is a relationship between the quality of acquisition and 
the level of security awareness and understanding in an organization. The research further suggests that 
those who have a higher quality of acquisition in general are more apt to include security consideration 
in their acquisition criteria. In this research, the effect of experience, management, and end-users were 
used in order to address the quality of acquisition. In future research, a more comprehensive study of 
the effect of the above three factors directly on security and the possible relationship would enhance 
the ability to predict acquisition success and suggest starting points for organizations to drive 
improvements in their security programs.  Further research efforts are also needed to explain why 
experience and management attitudes have a negative effect on the quality of acquisition strategy.  
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10.3 Question Background & Scoring Criteria 
Question Scoring Criteria & Explanation 
1 0/3 = Less than one year 
1/3 = 0-3 years 
2/3 = 3-5 year 
3/3 = 5+ years 
Scoring Rationale: Increased time with a company should enable the decision maker to 
better understand processes and other organizational relationships. Note that this is not 
years of IT or other work experience, but experience within this specific organization. 
References: [14], [15], [16] 
2 0/3 = Intern/Student 
1/3 = System Administrator / IT Staff (non-management) 
2/3 = Manager 
3/3 = Executive 
Scoring Rationale: Increased rank usually indicates increased authority and therefore a 
greater ability to control the direction of the acquisition process. 
References: [14], [17] 
3 0/3 = High School / GED or trade school 
1/3 = Associates / 2 Year Degree 
2/3 = Bachelors / 4 Year Degree or Associates + Advanced Certification or Training 
3/3 = Post-Graduate Degree or Certification or Bachelors + Advanced Certification or 
Training 
Scoring Rationale: Higher levels of education expose decision makers to new perspectives 
and strategies which may influence their decision making. Note that this question is 
concerned with decision making experience and therefore the education does not 
necessarily need to be technical or IT oriented. 
References: [16] 
4 0/3 = Training opportunities are not provided by the organization 
1/3 = Training is only provided for participant and not other members of the IT staff 
2/3 = Training opportunities exist, but the participant does not often utilize 
3/3 = Participant attends at least one training or conference per year 
Scoring Rationale: Increased training allows a decision maker to be aware of current 
opportunities, methods, and concepts and provides knowledge sharing and questioning 
opportunities. 
5 0/3 = Participant does not regularly utilize any information sources 
1/3 = Participant only utilizes high level technical news sources (e.g., Slashdot, Digg, etc.) 
2/3 = Participant utilizes professional, industry, or other higher level periodical and 
resources 
3/3 = Participant participates in interactive forums or networking groups on a regular basis 
Scoring Rationale: Indicates to what extent the participant attempts to stay current with 
technology and business challenges.  
References: [14], [16], [18] 
6 0/3 = Acquisition is never a planned or budgeted activity and is almost always reactive to 
immediate needs 
1/3 = Acquisition is not planned for in advance, but budget resource are set aside 
2/3 = Acquisition is mostly planned, but is sometimes reactive to immediate needs when it 
could have been planned for instead.   
3/3 = Acquisition is almost always a planned activity 
Scoring Rationale: A reactive approach is often rushed and may not consider sufficient 
criteria to choose an effective solution because of time constraints. 
7 0/3 = Initiation for acquisition only happens when there is a technological failure 
1/3 = Projects are "sacred cows" and are only initiated as personal interest of a high level 
decision maker or member of management 
2/3 = The decision to initiate an acquisition project can only come from within the IT 
department 
3/3 = Any member of the organization can suggest that an acquisition project should be 
initiated 
Scoring Rationale:  The need for an IT acquisition project may not be solely technical and 
instead should be driven by business needs. If business users or management have the 
ability to suggest acquisition projects there will be a strong alignment between IT and 
business strategy. 
References: [19] 
8 0/2 = Individuals who are inappropriate decision contributors are frequently involved in the 
decision to begin an acquisition project 
1/2 = There is an inappropriate number of individuals who are involved in the initiation 
phase of an acquisition project 
2/2 = There is an appropriate number of individuals who are qualified involved in the 
decision to move forward with an acquisition project 
Scoring Rationale: When under-qualified or inappropriate people become involved in the 
decision to begin an acquisition project the project may be stalled or terminated when in the 
absence of those persons the project would move forward as decided by qualified and 
appropriate individuals. 
References: [20] 
9 Not Scored 
Question Background: Individuals that are involved in acquisition activities more frequently 
may have more experience and will have greater opportunities to review and improve their 
strategies. 
References: [21], [15] 
10 0/3 = The participant cannot define the acquisition process at all and does not provide any 
information about the steps or activities done in order to select a component 
1/3  = The participant performs minimal research and review or is locked into solutions from 
preferred vendors and does perform objective assessment of such solutions 
2/3 = The participant is not active in the process and only evaluates or approves the results 
of another individuals decision. 
3/3 = The participant has a good understanding of the acquisition process, even if not 
formalized; the participant consults resources and makes a qualified evaluation of options 
Scoring Rationale: If a decision maker does not fully evaluate the choices it may be difficult 
or impossible to ensure that the component is good fit for the complete IT infrastructure 
and business needs. 
References: [22], [18], [21], [14], [23], [24] 
11,12,13 0/2 = The participant provides almost no criteria or qualities to compare components 
1/2 = The participant only provides limited definitions and criteria for comparison 
2/2 = The participant provides a thorough definition and demonstrates a justification for the 
criteria used for comparing and defining possible component selections 
Scoring Rationale: Participants that do not have definitions for what they are looking or not 
looking for in a product are less inclined to objectively compare options.  
References: [17], [21], [23], [25] 
14 Not Scored 
Question Background: Interesting to consider if the quality of acquisition is related to 
approval processes and if the approval process limits or effects acquisition activities either 
positively or adversely. 
15 Not Scored 
Question Background: Interesting to consider possible trends and if certain types of 
resistance or lack of resistance have an effect on acquisition. 
References: [22], [21]  
16 Not Scored 
Question Background: Investigates efforts that are taken to prepare for implementation 
after a component has been selected. 
17,18,19 0/3 = Participant externalizes blame and/or does not believe any measures could have been 
taken to prevent the failure 
1/3 = Participant was slow to diagnose or recognize problem or was slow to act on a solution 
to the problem 
2/3 = Participant can identify the root cause of the problem 
3/3 = Participant has identified the cause of the failure and has adjusted her strategy for 
future acquisition projects 
Scoring Rationale: Measures whether or not the participant uses previous acquisition project 
failures to learn a lesson or if the participant does not seek to improve future acquisition 
efforts  
References: [26], [16] 
20 Not Scored 
Question Background: Investigates non-IT involvement in evaluating the success and failure 
of an acquisition project. While a project may succeed from an IT perspective, it may be a 
failure from a business or management perspective. Outside validation is important aspect 
of communication and can help improve the process in the future. 
References: [21] 
21 Not Scored 
Question Background: Interesting to see how organizational structure effects the acquisition 
process and information sharing, which is a component of communication.  
22 0/2 = In the participant's organization there is tight control over assets and limited 
information flow 
1/2 = There is a some degree of information flow, but boundaries still exist for cross-
organizational communication 
2/2 = There is a high degree of information flow and/or channels exist to facilitate cross-
organizational communication 
Scoring Rationale: With a limited degree of communication it may be more difficult for the IT 
staff to get the necessary information and interaction for higher quality acquisition. 
References: [17], [21] 
23 0/2 = Management does a poor job of communication with the company or communication 
is highly restrictive 
1/2 = There is only a limited degree of communication from management 
2/2 = Management provides a high degree of communication 
Scoring Rationale: Management communication style with the company can influence open 
communication throughout the organization. 
24 0/3 = Management provides minimal direction and interaction opportunities 
1/3 = Management provides limited one-way communication 
2/3 = Management provides regular communication and is open to interaction 
3/3 = Management is open and accessible and encourages two-way communication 
Scoring Rationale: IT decision makers may require input and support from management in 
order to push forward IT initiatives and acquisition projects. Management communication 
style may affect the ability for IT decision makers to acquire resources or move forward 
initiatives 
25 0/3 = Management demonstrates a low level of concern and interaction for the IT 
department 
1/3 = Management provides objectives and direction to the IT department, but is not 
interested in the IT department providing input or discussing the directions 
2/3 = Management is open to two-way communication with the IT department and its staff 
3/3 = Management is interested in IT direction being primarily driven by the IT staff and 
encourages two-way discussion of IT direction 
Scoring Rationale: Management's involvement and willingness to discuss IT objectives with 
the IT staff may affect the IT decision maker's ability to perform quality acquisition. 
26 0/3 = There is no management intervention or important management decision makers are 
not involved 
1/3 = Management's involvement is superficial or inappropriate people are involved 
2/3 = Management is only concerned from a financial standpoint 
3/3 = Management provides visibility and an appropriate level of involvement 
Scoring Rationale: An organization's management has a primary focus on ensuring that 
business continues to operate in the desired direction. Without involvement or transparency 
into IT acquisition decisions there may be no oversight to ensure that the acquisition is 
appropriate to the organization's business needs. 
References: [27] 
27 Not Scored 
Question Background: Indicates whether or not the participant considers the full system 
lifecycle during acquisition and if IT has a strong influence on business operations and 
processes. 
28 0/2 = Management only considers IT a financial cost center 
1/2 = Management consider IT to be an important part of the organization's operations 
2/2 = Management recognizes IT as important and provides the proper consideration, 
resources, etc. 
Scoring Rationale: If management does not perceive the value of IT they may resources 
which may be necessary in order for an acquisition maker to perform higher quality 
acquisition 
29 0/2 = The participant does not believe that the exact selection matters 
1/2 = The participant believes there is only a limited impact from her choices 
2/2 = The participant believes there is a significant impact on the organization 
Scoring Rationale: Indicates whether the decision maker considers business rationale as well 
as user requirements and user behavior in their decisions. If a decision maker does not think 
that a decision can have a significant impact they may not perform as thorough an 
investigation during the acquisition. 
References: [28] 
30 Not Scored 
Question Background: Question is intended to see if there is a trend or relationship between 
end-user computer literacy and the acquisition or security. 
31 0/2 = Participant does not seek end-user input and disregards any input given 
1/2 = Participant will listen to use input, but does not actively solicit user for input 
2/2 = Participant values and seeks input from end-users 
Scoring Rationale: Users interact with many systems and are most familiar with business 
processes. Even for systems which are not user-facing there is still likely the need to provide 
support for some business function. Therefore, user input can be a valuable factor in making 
an informed decision. 
References: [28] 
32 Not Scored 
Question Background: This question further investigates the user attitudes and may be 
helpful at identifying practices and trends compared to a participants acquisition quality 
score. 
References: [22], [29], [30] 
33 0/2 = Users do not report problems when they occur and the IT staff is dependent upon 
technical or their own investigation to discover problems 
1/2 = Users will sometimes seek assistance, but the participant believes there is need from 
improvement 
2/2 = Communication about system and software issues is sufficient and appropriate 
Scoring Rationale:  This question serves as a measure of communication between end-users 
and the IT staff. In addition, it indicates whether or not end-users are comfortable bringing 
issues and desires to the IT staff. 
References: [31] 
34 0/2 = Users demonstrate a high level of resistance 
1/2 = Within the user group there are laggards or there is only reluctance instead of 
resistance 
2/2 = Most users are accepting of change and there are few, if any, laggards 
Scoring Rationale:  If users do not accept a new system they may rely upon old systems or 
shortcuts, which defeat the purpose of acquiring a new system or component. 
35 0/2 = There is no end-user involvement before or after the acquisition process 
1/2 = There is only user involvement before or only involvement after the acquisition 
2/2 = There is user involvement both before and after the acquisition 
Scoring Rationale: Increased user involvement can help to ensure that new technical 
components fit with business needs and business processes. 
References:  [31], [28] 
36 Not Scored 
Question Background: Indicates if the organization or IT staff understands the relationship 
between business process and technology. Further indicates that the IT staff has trained 
employees to be aware of policies and proper usage of systems and components. 
References: [17], [31] 
37 Not Scored 
Question Background: Indicates the extent to which the acquisition project is planned. Also 
serves as a measure between IT staff and end-user interaction. 
38 Not Scored 
Question Background: Provides insight into the relationships between the IT staff and end-
users, as well as policy enforcement. User acceptance is also a factor in long-term acquisition 
success. 
References: [28] 
39 0/2 = Management is not concerned to any extent about IT security requirements or issues 
1/2 = Management recognizes security issues, but it is only of minimal importance to them 
2/2 = Management is aware of security concerns and displays appropriate concern 
Scoring Rationale: If management is not concerned about IT security they may not provide 
adequate resources for the IT team to address security needs. 
References: [32], [31], [33], [27], [25], [12] 
40 Not Scored 
Question Background: Intended to understand what motivates individuals to be concerned 
with security. May result in trends which correlate to the level of security awareness. 
References: [32] 
41 Not Scored 
Question Background: Intended to see if security exists for the sake of securing the 
organization or simply meeting compliance. May also display a trend between level of 
regulation and level of security awareness. 
42 0/3 = The organization has no security policies or principles which may affect acquisition 
1/3 = Security policies exist but have no impact on acquisition  
2/3 = Policies do not directly address security and acquisition, but the policies influence the 
decision maker's selections 
3/3 = Explicit policies exist in regards to the role of security in an acquisition project. 
Scoring Rationale: This question measures the decision maker and the organization's 
concern for security. Also indicates to what extent, if any, security is factored into the 
decision strategy. 
References: [22], [33], [25], [12], [24] 
43 0/3 = There are no formal or informal policies and/or participant indicates "complete trust" 
in the end-users 
1/3 = There exist informal policies to address security and end-user usage of systems 
2/3 = There exist formal policies, however, these policies are either not comprehensive or 
are not enforced 
3/3 = End-user related security policies exist which are enforced and comprehensive 
Scoring Rationale: If end-users are not aware of the proper usage they cannot be expected 
to act with security in mind. Policies which are unclear or are not enforced provide little 
incentive for users to comply. 
44 Not Scored 
Question Background: Investigates methodologies and controls which are used. This may be 
useful to establish trends. 
References: [22], [33], [27], [34], [24] 
45 0/3 = There are no security policies in place to evaluate 
1/3 = The policies that exist are poorly written and/or the users are unaware of their 
obligations under these policies 
2/3 = The users are aware of the policies but they generally do not comply and follow them 
3/3 = The users are aware of the policies and understand the consequences; for the most 
part users comply with these policies 
Scoring Rationale: The mere existence of policies is insufficient if they are unclear and the 
end-users are not aware of the policies and their obligations under those policies.  
References: [17], [32], [27] 
46 Not Scored 
Question Background: Intended to see if the organization has any internal knowledge and 
understanding of IT security and if this affects the level of security awareness and 
implementation. 
References: [22], [17], [33], [27], [24], [35] 
47 0/2 = Security is not considered at all as a component of the participant's decision strategy 
1/2 = Security is considered, but is not an important factor in the decision strategy 
2/2 = Security is considered an important aspect of acquisition decision strategy 
Scoring Rationale: This addresses one of the main questions of this research and directly 
asks the participant for the extent to which they consider security during acquisition. 
References: [20], [36], [25] 
48 Not Scored 
Question Background: Intended to see what controls and measures are used to establish 
security. In addition, evaluates whether the participant considers existing security 
components when new components are introduced into an IT system. 
References: [22] 
49 Not Scored 
Question Background: Used to explore the participant's attitudes towards security in the 
acquisition process. 
50 Not Scored 
Question Background: At this point the primary purpose of this research has been explained 
to the participant and this question provides the opportunity to directly address this topic 
and to clarify or readdress any topics discussed earlier. 
 
  




5 He is a system administrator and relies upon peers and vendor newsletter for his sources of 
information. 
8 At the lower levels they do much more research and bring the options to those at the higher 
level who are more concerned with financial matters. 
9 IT is seen as overhead expense of customer projects; hard for IT team to drive IT spending 
because most spending is customer driven. 
10 Look for the most popular options. Popularity was defined as order in page ranking, which is not 
an objective or measure of any quality. 
18 No plans to replace faulty system because too much is already invested into this system and the 
impact on the total IT infrastructure would be too great. 
19 Analyzing the ease of use and management would improve acquisition because we cannot be 
experts in everything. 
23 Downward information flow is too slow, we find out about information too late and we therefore 
must work and make decisions under compressed schedule.   
29 Common end-users do not care about the systems they use. 
31 The users that are highly computer literate do not usually provide anything useful and their input 
is seen as an annoyance.  
32 Training is very important. If the training will be too complex we will not select. 
34 Normal end-users are receptive to change; developers are a point of resistance. 
36 There is no mandated user training. There are supposed to be user SMEs, but most of the time 
they are not knowledgeable in the areas where they claim to have expertise.  
39 Management understands security concerns for company. However, self-enforcement is poor at 
the higher level. For example, top-people would print customer data against policy. 
40 We would like to have more internal focus on security, but management will not provide the 
resources to extend security efforts. 
50 Products with frequent updates that are easy to roll out are more secure. Security is a managed 
process, not a reaction to bugs or incidents. 
 Participant Summary: Much greater depth of research is conducted at lower level and upper 
level IT personnel make the final decision. Management believes in security, but does not 
provide adequate funding and resources. Lack of communication and greater organizational 
understanding of IT needs outside of the customer requirements can reduce the ability to make 




5 Reads traditional business sources such as Baron’s, Business Week, etc and some industry 
specific publications. Participant notes that he takes note of the IT articles, but doesn’t really 
understand them. Should be noted that there is no internal IT personnel in the company and 
that he is the primary decision maker related to IT concerns. 
6 High amount of reactive acquisition that is not preplanned in advance. 
10 IT is outsourced to consultants. The consultants are active and on the premises regularly during 
normal operations. Consultants do the bulk the research and decision making, but they have 
reviewed multiple consultants with references before choosing a particular consultant. 
15 (Specific Instance) While the consultant came highly recommended, he was unable to work well 
with the internal end-users. The system selected was more confusing and less user friendly. It 
does not seem as if the consultant made a decision based on the internal needs of the 
organization. 
17 Two reputable vendor/consultants from different organizations could not work together. Were 
not prepared or knowledgeable to mediate between the two. 
19 Must evaluate consultant and make sure they not only have experience in the field, but 
experience within the specific industry and with company size. Participant notes that 
consultants who usually deal with large companies perform poorly at smaller companies. Must 
be prepared to do own self-evaluation and remove poor consultants if they do not live up to 
their reputation. 
23 They are a small company (≈40 employees); has regular conference call where all employees at 
all levels can participate. Executive management has strong communication with managers. 
28 Participant claims IT assessment is critical to planning, however see responses to question 5, 6, 
& 10 above. All decision input comes from outsiders who may not truly understand company’s 
goals.  
33 Believes that proactive technology is sufficient to alert them of problems before users. This 
attitude assumes that all problems are performance or feature related. 
36 Currently insufficient, takes a very long time for users to be productive on new systems. 
Believes an increase in end-user IT training would be beneficial.  Again, this points to the 
externalization of IT and the affect on internal understanding. Since IT is identified as important 
and a driving factor and that the choices greatly affect the user’s productivity, it would make 
sense to have someone internally vested in making good IT decisions.   
38 Do to the lack of training above, users would often continue working on legacy system negating 
the possible benefit of the new system and requiring maintenance and training on two systems, 
increase confusion and costs.  
39 Believes security is important and that it is being taken care of by managed services. Reports 
are available, but no one internally has reviewed these security reports. Reliant upon 
consultants, however, participant notes that he is not aware of consultant having any specific 
security background and the consultants have never mentioned security. 
44 Participant is unaware of the regulations they are governed under and believes that the size of 
the company affects obligation under regulations. Does not believe the company maintains 
what is commonly considered sensitive or personal information. 
46,47, 
48 
Reliant upon the consultant for security input. Assumes the consultant is offering such services 
or solutions. Assumes if the consultant suggests something is may often be a scare tactic and 
that the size and profile of the company and the types of systems used limit possible exposure. 
Because there is no history of attack, does see any reason to devote more attention. 
49 Secure knowledgeable people to make good decision who understand your business size, and 
needs, that you can trust over time. Like systems, test and evaluate people over time. 
50 Participant does not appreciate the need for security or understand what constitutes sensitive 
data: Identifies that company stores billing and contact information, but does not believe this 
needs protection. Participant compares business to TJX claiming they don’t have sensitive 
information that could be attacked. When further questioned, participant identifies that the 
company processes credit card transactions, but believes that firewalls and monitoring are 
sufficient. Is unaware of obligations under PCI rules. In reality, the size compared to TJX does 
not limit obligations or targeting.  
 Participant Summary: This organization has no internal IT reference or anyone specifically 
concerned with IT. However, the company understands the importance of IT, how it drives 
business, and how it can affect user productivity. Heavily reliant upon external consultants and 
managed services. Consultant action and managed service reports are not critiqued unless 
there are big obvious problems. Strong misconception that size and business lead to security by 
obscurity. Internal access restrictions and information privacy are not well understood. 





3 No formal IT training or certifications.  
10 Very few vendors due to the nature of the business. Primary concern is total system 
integration. Important to consider similar businesses. 
11 Low level of internal knowledge, therefore highly dependent upon good vendor relationship, 
training, and straightforward system. 
15 Resistance comes because users do not want to take extra steps. Cites examples of requiring 
second login on encrypted systems. 
17 Focused on the core modules of the system, but did not fully evaluate other features that were 
included and eventually used. These secondary modules did not function properly – our 
evaluation was not extensive enough. 
19 The process needs to be better defined to ensure all criteria are satisfied and all features are 
evaluated. Must perform the greatest extent of due diligence with references, dig into their 
experience. 
29  Small changes are not really important, only if the core system changed since that may affect 
multiple processes. However, at mentioned above the introduction of extra steps greatly 
affects productivity and user acceptance.   
36 Training is very important. “Train the trainer” to establish SMEs and internal knowledge.  Need 




In a highly regulated industry (financial) therefore the external pressures are very real and the 
core guidelines and requirements are well known. However, the participant note that there is 
no “clearing house” that informs you of your compliance and other legal requirements. 
Interestingly, the participant notes that the best indicator for an important compliance issue is 
the number of people trying to sell the company solutions to meet that regulation. 
45 Extremely high level of training, education, and reeducation. Posters are printed, emails are 
sent out, and annual sign off is required.   
49 Be concerned for the accidental information exposure and curious user. People tend to snoop 
around, to combat this they need a lot of training on security awareness. Security training is an 
ongoing process. 
50 Security must be a component of acquisition – should be considered in tandem with the data 
stored/accessed by the product to determine the importance, value, and the data’s security 
values. Participant understands security is important because of trickledown effects: Business 
and customers coexist in a financial ecosystem. Fraud and security failures that are not 
anticipated can lead to costs which affect everyone in the ecosystem. Important for the other 
businesses and customers to interact with to be secure as well. 
 Participant Summary: The participant does not have any formal IT or security background. 
However, the industry is highly regulated. As a result, security implications are very clear and 
constant through all stages of the SDLC. In turn, this necessitates considering security in 
acquisition because the system has a limited tolerance for insecurity. While this is true for the 
IT people and management, users are not as concerned with security, even in the highly 
regulated industry. As a result, the participant notes that there must be continual monitoring, 
auditing, and training to limit and control internal threats. Security is understood beyond the 




6 Fairly spontaneous in regards to the overall company, technological environments are often 
customer specific and segregated form main systems. Within the customer’s need more 
planned, however focus is on the customer over the internal company’s needs. 
10 Formalized process and review materials for qualified research organizations like Gardner’s. 
Look for long term partners, who are not necessarily big, but have received recognition (not 
clearly specified who they are trusting to provide the recommendation). They hire direct SMEs 
and consultants when necessary. 
14,16 Implementation plan is laid out in a project format. This entails setting up the roll-out schedule 
and training before going live. There is a sandboxing period and stress testing before going live. 
15 Some people have religious devotion to languages or vendors, which inhibits getting the best of 
breed. 
17,18 Product was not fully tested and does not perform properly. They now have to use 
workarounds and cannot replace this component do to high integration with the rest of the 
system.  
21 Hierarchical approach has improved communication flows and increases the line of authority 
which increases the chances of successfully arriving at a component to implement. 
32 There is a formal project termination and project review process where owners and managers 
evaluate the component choice. Very important in this organization since they try to build 
solutions that can be redeployed to new customers with only minimal changes. 
36 A lot of training is offered. The buy courseware and will help people maintain their 
certifications, but the participant implies this is not often utilized. 
39,40 The biggest drive comes from the customers, who may have regulations or requirements. This 
organization holds sensitive information which the clients want protected. Aware of specific 
regulations that affect their industry. 
42 Existence of policy is a requirement of the customers. There is strong consciousness of security 
concerns, but it is not necessarily spelled out.  
47 There is a very high consideration of controls, access, and encryption. Multiple clients are 
managed on the same systems, so the highest level of isolation is importance from a business 
standpoint. Customers can specify employee access controls and demand auditing. {{For 
analysis, security is best when it is driven by business not IT}} 
 Participant Summary: This organization deals with a large volume of sensitive data. All levels of 
the company understand the need to protect private and confidential data. While not all clients 
specify security requirements, the fact that some do can help create general security practices 
across the board. This participate had a strong focus on good support and open protocols (not 
necessarily FOSS), however software must be malleable enough or allow integration to make 




7 This organization relies primarily upon specific industry software with limited number of 
vendors. Therefore, they do not expect ideal systems and try to limit acquisitions until 
necessary (preferring to create hack or work around) because of the possible changes to 
business processes. 
8 Participant is at high level and in charge of the majority of financial approvals and therefore 
wants other people to validate and comment on possible options before approval. 
10 Share knowledge with other members of industry consortium and follow industry trends and 
movements to new components. Also asks vendors for input and recommendations on 
complimentary and products that will work with existing systems. 
14 Very involved roll-out to implementation process. Roll-out to core group of testers and tweak 
before mass deployment. Features are evaluated before purchase, how to actually implement 
is a post purchase consideration. 
17,18, 
19 
Had a previous relationship with the vendor and had developed a level of trust. Vendor did not 
perform all obligations. This was no apparent until the system went live. The participant 
believes this could not have been predicted, even though the program was tested in a sandbox. 
31 Seeks user input if available. Those who are more IT-inclined will likely move into a dedicated IT 
position rather than remaining in a business role. 
32 Service driven industry and therefore it is extremely important for end-users to have reliable 
systems that they like. Users are highly involved and actively encouraged to provide input. As 
noted in #7 above, try to maintain business process, but participant is willing to allow processes 
to be modified by software if there is a business case for increased productivity.  
34 Participant notes that user acceptance has increased as communication efforts were increased; 
users are much more likely to accept new software if it is explained to them the benefit to the 
organization and/or to them. Note, that communication improvements are both upward and 
downward. 
40 Participant has extremely high understanding of what constitutes sensitive information and the 
responsibilities of being a data custodian. This also extends to users and management. In 
addition, security is often specified in client RFP. 
41 Participant understands that the organization is governed by PCI, but all processing takes place 
by a third party. Most data storage and other information assets is also stored and managed by 
third party. 
44 Users understand security concerns, however, participant does limited security beyond what is 
built into existing systems because of difficulty in implementing and push-back from users. 
There have been no security incidents in the past to act at motivator.  
46 We rely on looking at everyone else in the industry and using their solutions. Participant does 
not believe that they need an internal security person or increased security precautions. This is 
interesting considering they have a strong belief in providing security and currently weak 
implementation and enforcement. 
47 Security is always a concern, however it is not a primary focus because participant does not 
believe the company will be attacked. Furthermore, we can’t control the storage of the data 
because that is with a third party vendor. The participant believes that because they are not 
physically controlling the data the security burden is transferred to the third party custodian. 
 
50 Participant believes that security needs vary depending on the particular component, its 
function, and the types of data it accesses. Furthermore believes that the big-name companies 
would not be able to stay in business if they did not prove security and that newcomers must 
first prove themselves to be trusted. Because security is a hot topic within this industry, the 
participant believes that this also transfers to the vendor’s offerings since everyone else would 
not be buying it if it did not do security properly. 
 Participant Summary: Participant believes that she is limited to specific vendor set and that 
furthermore that the big player software vendors for this industry are the best because the 
group uses them. Furthermore, with an expectation that software will never meet 
requirements the participant is lead to be more accepting of mistakes and faulty promises, 
which can increase the likelihood of establishing a poor trust relationship. Participant believes 
that outsourcing payment processing and storage is sufficient to address security. However, 
internal security controls are not well enforced and the motivation to increase security would 
likely only be motivated by the occurrence of a breech. Assumes that because the industry itself 




2 Participant mentions security tasks as one the main position responsibilities.  
7 Initiation can come from IT decisions, monitoring reports, user community (specific process 
exists to facilitate end-user initiation of a possible IT acquisition.  
9 Extremely high relative frequency of acquisition projects- many small 2 day projects and maybe 
around 20 capital expenditures.  Participant notes that a very high percentage of his time is 
involved in evaluating new opportunities or solutions for existing needs. 
12 Vendors must strongly built case. The company often has vendors critique competitor products 
to build a full matrix. May even hire a consultant to provide input in acquisition (if the 
technology is new to us) because they do not want to replace later and know the limits of their 
own knowledge and expertise. Ideally find recommendations from the most similar company. 
17 VAR lead participant to believe that they had provided this solutions before; believe they did 
not ask specific enough questions from references. The individual components of the 
acquisition had good reviews, but the system as a whole had no previous case support and did 
not work well together. 
23,24, 
25 
Management exists mostly in an ivory tower. Information flows to the company mostly on a 
need-to-know basis. Participant notes it is hard to move projects forward and that most of his 
communication efforts are only in passing and there is often breaks and restarts required in any 
project. IT is seen as a cost center to be controlled, very little management concern for IT. 
28 Management sees IT as a necessary evil and does not believe in the ability of IT to drive 
business forward. It is very hard to convince management to back innovative or opportunistic IT 
projects. Management is not primarily concerned with soft (people) benefits, but would 
approve of IT systems that could cut costs and personnel.  
31 Small number of end-users with high computer literacy. They provide ideas on a limited basis, 
but they are actively sought out for and are believed to be helpful in justify the business case 
for an IT component. 
32 We establish a small pilot group during the selection phase of the acquisition process and 
actively solicit feedback in the formal project closing and on an ongoing basis through our 
support system.  
34 Users are very afraid of change and new systems. While they recognize there will be new 
benefits, they are not highly concerned with an opportunity for increased productivity of ease 
of use. Interesting to note that users seem to be highly involved in the acquisition process in 
this organization, however, note the management attitudes on communication and towards IT. 
36 High amount of training is offered and employees are regularly sent out from IT system and 
skills training. Training is a definite part of new systems and even small system changes. 
37 Participant notes difficulty in disseminating information because IT mostly has to rely on 
functional managers to propagate information. Sometimes can use broadcast email or talk to 
affected groups in hallways conversations. However, announcing new changes has often been 
problematic in the past. 
40 Understand regulation and possibility for personal information exposure, however, the main 
concern is protecting internal intellectual property.  
45 Security policies are clear and often reevaluated, but participant believes employees need 
stronger annual review, specific IT security training, higher focus in employee on-boarding, and 
increased managerial awareness to integrate into business process. 
46 The participant has a strong background in IT audit and there is a system administrator level 
individual who is in charge of security issues as part of his responsibilities.  
50 The biggest challenge comes from the ever increasing number of non-uniform and poorly 
written security regulations. Furthermore, it is unclear what the implications of certain state 
laws (e.g., Massachusetts and Nevada) are at a national level. These laws are clearly note 
written with sufficient input from IT professionals and are often use ambiguous language. As a 
result, security policies must be reevaluated against every law that you believe affects your 
organization. 
 
User involvement and interaction in terms of security in important because it helps them 
understand requirements and sensitivity requirements of data. In addition, it is important to 
understand the business case that drives the need for security at the fundamental level 
(beyond compliance concerns) in order to determine the specific security action that data sets 
or processes require. 
 Participant Summary: This individual has a very strong background and understanding of 
security concerns. The biggest limiting factor in acquisition success is this organization would 
seem to be top-management. Information does not flow easily through this organization, and 
management only sees IT as a cost center. There exists good communication and interaction 
with the end-users in general and in respect to acquisition, however, without management 





10 In the past users would come with a specific product they wanted to buy, how IT works harder 
to discuss actual needs and does the evaluation of options with their IT background to meet 
business needs. To get the options, they send out RFP to the same few big vendors. They know 
who to contact from previous experience and because “90% of the industry” uses the same four 
products. This would however necessitate that in the past projects were successful, that others 
in the industry have very similar requirements, and that internally and externally they had 
performed a thorough and proper evaluation. 
13 They look to select a vendor with a good reputation, which is primarily defined by the years of 
experience with the product. It is very easy to determine those with a bad reputation based on 
industry trade reviews, however, if the product is not industry specific, then the general review 
is more important the opinion from only inside of the industry. Next it is important that the 
vendor defines how they will stand behind their product through support, service, and 
maintenance offerings. The perception that there are only a few major players in some area can 
make it hard to find new offerings or unknown options which may have a “good” reputation. 
15 Resistance can occur anywhere in the process. Some leaders may try to stop progress because 
they personally prefer an old system or want to divert funds elsewhere or the business owner 
of the application and the end-user either do or do not want change. Resistance also occurs in 
the change process, which may be attributed to the users being minimally informed about 
upcoming changes. 
25,26 For the most part upper management leaves him alone; however, this also results in them 
usually providing insufficient feedback. There is a specific IT committee composed of some 
upper level people when it comes to making decisions and in addition some IT decisions may go 
to a budget committee. It is often the case that inappropriate people from upper management 
try to gain influence and get involved. 
30,34 The users are highly literate because the workforce is young, however, even the older 
employees posses above-expected proficiency. The users are also fairly accepting of new 
changes and for the most part understand that the changes are there for their benefit.  
35 There is a lot of feedback gathered through surveys, user groups. The change/implementation 
team continues to exist after implementation to monitor the system and provide feedback. 
37 Software is deployed early outside of production for users to experiment and get familiar. 
Training is usually mandatory and performed in small, manageable doses. The main driving 
concept is to make a smooth, gradual change.  
43,44, 
45 
Users are highly aware of the proper systems and work in a controlled environment limiting use 
through both controls and policy. As the primary IT decision maker he is concerned about both 
accidental and malicious incidents. 
48 Participant notes that end user education is of primary importance. He also notes that it is 
important to monitor emerging threats and to stay on top of security trends. 
50 The participant notes that security must go beyond the law’s requirements, but does not seem 
to understand the importance of the individualized requirements of any acquisition case.  The 
participant also notes that larger companies have access to more resources. As a result, he is 
concerned that smaller firms may lack expertise and take an attitude that if “I don’t think about 
it, it doesn’t exist”. Lastly, he expanded on determining the quality of peers: Sometimes, it is 
not possible to tell if the person giving advice is experienced or an expert, but that you can still 
learn from them if they have common experience and common views. Individual credentials are 
not important, but the best answers come from those who can fully explain their point and 
reasoning and can break down a complex problem with meaningful answers. Networking and 
exchanging information is essential for success in acquisition and many other IT processes. 
 Participant Summary: This participant is highly aware of the interplay and needs of the users, 
and in addition, the users are very aware of their obligations. There are very strong 
communication channels between IT and the users in this organization. Management 
understands the importance of IT and IT security; however, they are only minimally involved 




5 This participant notes that he often will look for information out of curiosity and often utilizes 
interns and younger employees to bring him up to date on the latest trends. Often he is looking 
through trade magazines for opportunities and to see what is out there that can address 
problems that are currently being evaluated. 
8 Try to be as collaborative as possible in decision making. There are no real boundaries of who 
can be involved, and in general he tries to involve those who will have the most involvement 
with the component. 
 
14 After selecting a component, it is tested in a sandbox for up to six months before being put into 
production. During this time keep the old systems online and evaluate if this platform will meet 
requirements after the pre-purchase screening. User training will occur before going live as 
well. 
15 The end-users are resistant to change and it is often difficult to bring them up to speed (thus 
the emphasis on training and informing above). When evaluating the product, we are 
evaluating how it will change our business processes – to what degree will we use the system, 
will we implement all aspects? Based on the component offerings we may modify our 
expectations for the system, which could affect processed not originally considered.  
29 End-users usually do not care what system they are working on. However, it is very important 
to select a system that is easy to use and that they like. 
32 Participant mentions that it is very difficult to push components onto users, however, if they 
will accept it is based upon the decision of IT and management. This is odd considering the 
above focus on involvement of end-users and the answers to #15. Participant also notes the he 
evaluate activity logs and talks with users to gather their feelings on systems. Perhaps, they do 
have enough understanding to make decisions on the user’s behalf. 
39 In terms of general IT, management allows a great deal of autonomy. In terms of security, 
management is not interested and does not consider it. Often, they management is actively 
against security because they like open access. Since it is not important to them and they are 
often resistant to security measures, we usually do not involve them in security related issues 
and try to do the most we can with our budget in this area. 
40 There are no external motivations for implementing security. In the participant’s previous work 
experience, the lack of security constantly caused problems and therefore security is 
considered important here because it as seen as improving the ability to focus on other tasks. 
There is not a large concern over protecting internal data; however, they are more concerned 
with the threat of data-loss or corruption. It is interesting to note that participant’s correlation 
of security with backup and data control. 
 
 
42,45 Participant wants to increase security control and security awareness, however, security is 
secondary as the business is rapidly growing and there is not enough support from outside of IT. 
43,44 Participant does not see himself as a policeman; believes people are good and there has not 
been any incidents reported in the past. Would change policies and increase lock-downs if there 
was cause. Also, should note management’s desire for openness mentioned in #40. 
50 One suggestion the participant puts forward is to go for the low hanging fruit – if there is 
something which can easily be implemented and secured, go for it. Look for the small tasks 
which have the greatest chance of successfully being completed. Believes he could do more to 
change the culture (e.g., password sharing) if management was onboard with security. 
 Summary: The participant notes that he is not a “big security guy” because he has not worked 
in a company where it has been important, and it is hard to convince management of the value 
of security. He knows the steps to take, but has not really developed them further or sought 
additional training because of organizational limitation. As a result, he had a misunderstanding 
of some security concepts discussed in the interview. In general though, they do a very 
thorough evaluation and the organization encourages open and rich communication channels. 
The acquisition process it considered in a lot of detail, however, the evaluation is mostly 




7 The department managers are the primary drivers of new initiatives, not IT; managers often 
plan and manage the initiatives. The people most involved in daily use create timeline and plan. 
10 Have established relationships with consultants who give a strong amount of input and do a lot 
of research for them. Usually the same consultant will be used through the SDLC. 
14 Training is very important. Because the company is very small everyone is cross trained so 
people can be shifted to priority tasks. Looks to make a smooth transition to the new systems. 
15 The business of business often takes priority over initiatives and training. 
20 The company is a shared environment, a total review is made and everyone communicates. 
When the end-users are not happy with a system, it is of prime importance. 
31 The majority of the company is very highly computer literate and therefore their input is always 
valued and the participant always seeks their input. 
34 They are excited for new technology, but at the same time they want to defend systems they 
believe are already good and with which they are comfortable.  
39 Uptime is absolutely crucial for this business and they are a prime target for attackers, 
therefore security is extremely important and a constant though throughout. 
42 Due to the nature of this business, products are almost all security focused and you need 
special licensing to even obtain these products. 
43,45 Most users are aware of their obligations, but still very close monitoring and auditing of activity 
is performed. Users are not trusted. For example, one employee was found to have hacked the 
system and was fired and all system access was removed within three hours. Start monitoring 
employees as soon as they do anything suspicious to protect the company. 
46 The Participant claims to be a businessperson and that she has little understanding of IT. 
However, she reads the security reports to ensure everything is functioning properly and takes 
action on all issues even if she does not have the technical knowhow to perform all steps. 
47,49 Security evaluation is of prime importance. Furthermore, the culture of security with both 
employees and customers is just as important. Security must be easy or it will not be used. It is 
important for everyone to understand the systems and how to use the controls, otherwise you 
will most likely not have good security and likely also wasted time and effort selecting and 
implementing the product. 
 Participant Summary: The main goals in acquisition are involvement and clear goal setting. 
However, the participant relies heavily on consultants even with internal IT staff and users with 
very high computer literacy. Also, throughout the interview she would make comments such as, 
“this is how things are done in a small business”; this line of thinking is dangerous because even 
within the same sector different organizations have different goals, plans, and priorities. 
Security is of fundamental importance in this industry and it is de facto part of the culture and 




8 Solutions are brought to a technology committee which consists of partners of the company; 
they want to provide input beyond just financial approval. The partners, however, are not 
necessarily technically inclined. This should lead the reader to question their suitability to make 
decisions. 
11 A good product is one that is reliable, which the participant defines as always working on 
demand and doing everything that the vendor claims it should do. Before selecting the product, 
whether or not the component does what is purports to do is based on user input and 
suggestions from members of a strategic alliance which is composed of multiple similar 
companies within the industry. The participant notes that the members of the alliance tend to 
use the same products, which he attributes to the alliance itself not the quality of the products. 
15 The participant notes that this organization operates in two locations and that the cultures of 
the two locations differ. In addition, the secondary office does not feel it gets a fair say in the 
decision making process. He also notes that most users do not want to learn anything new and 
that they are reluctant to take the time to stop their normal activities and educate themselves. 
It should be noted that he is placing the training onus on the end-users themselves.  
18,19 The participant again mentions user acceptance as an issue and mentions that when 
components were introduced poorly there was a much lower rate of adoption. When he 
discusses ways to avoid this problem he does not address the user involvement, but instead 
cites that more buy-in is required for managers and partners to push forward success. 
25,26 There are some members of the technical decision committee mentioned above in #8. While 
some are interested in IT, there are those who are not and the participant notes that this 
causes problems and slows down the process. In addition, the participant feels that the IT 
budget is set arbitrarily.  
32 The users can be involved in the demo process, but their opinions are not often considered 
unless there are large issues or concerns. The participant also notes that if the users hated a 
current system that would lead to a review of the product, but most likely would not start 
efforts to replace the product.  
34 The users are not resistant, but are reluctant to new systems “because the focus is mostly on 
their jobs”. He also reports that user will often try to get out of training and there is no external 
mechanism to force the users or reprimand them in this regard. 
38 Users will sometimes bring in unsupported tools which is detrimental to the workflow, but 
there is no official policy preventing this. 
39 Management is not very concerned or interested, however, the participant attempts to makes 
sure that it is put on the agenda and brought to their attention. 
41 We are not formally regulated, but we follow SoX guidelines and worksheets to help make our 
customers happier. This motivation for security comes from “following the crowd” and in reality 
only amounts to “security theater”. As in question #11 above, this organization is following the 
crowd. In this case, the compliance is bad because they are not focusing on their real security 
issues and instead are focusing on a set of regulations which do not necessarily even apply to 
them.  
45 The policies are clearly written, but we do not devote sufficient time to reviewing and making 
sure the users understand, as a result the users are not usually conscious of the policies in daily 
life. In addition, we do not have sufficiently strong internal monitoring and enforcement. 
46 His consultants are not security focused, but he believes they consider security. He is too busy 
with day to day operations to learn about security or devote time to its practice. He has a low 
internal motivation for security which may affect management and the users or the relationship 
may flow in a different direction. 
49 The participant notes that there is some auditing and accounting of end-user activity and 
believes that if the employees were more conscious that there were being watched they may 
improve their behavior.  He also cautions about non-approved tools that users may use to store 
or move data which could enable policy violation or result in insecure transmission or storage. 
50 The participant believes that it would benefit the acquisition process if there was a formal set of 
evaluation points that included common criteria, including security. He also notes that for data 
storage they use a third party who specializes in secure storage rather than running the chance 
of mis-configuration by internal staff. 
 Participant Summary: There is a poor relationship between the users and the IT department. 
This, however, seems correlated to the nature of the organization where the company partners 
have a very large control and do not provide rich communication channels or support for IT. As 
a result, there are often inappropriate people and inappropriate motivations for acquisition 
choices. The organizational culture lacks support for the IT team and as a result they are often 
powerless to enforce policies and to provide proper training. Lastly, the participant perceives 





8 Decision makers involved in the acquisition process can involve himself, the controller, and a 
specific partner who is in charge of technology. In some cases it may have to be approved by 
other partners, however, the participant is not sure exactly who else may be involved and if 
they are qualified to provide input on the task. 
15 Participant expresses difficulty convincing management of the value of IT acquisitions and that 
they often try to stay with technology long after it should be replaced. 
17,18, 
19 
Product did not work as advertised and described by the technician. The participant did not get 
a clear explanation and proof of concept before implementing. In this case he trusted the 
vendor without sufficient outside validation or referencing.  Participant also note that you 
should try to run systems in parallel as options which require a full switch are often hard to 
rollback in case of implementation failure.  
24,25 Management often will ignore the participant and he must make a concerted effort to bring 
matters to their attention. Overtime management is improving their perception of the 
importance of IT, however there is not champion within management to help push forward IT 
initiatives and facilitate communication. 
29 Participant has a hard time defining criteria except in very broad terms saying that it matters of 
course “if it works” and that it fits within budgetary constraints.  
32 There is usually minimal end-user involvement; participant and management believe they 
understand the users’ needs and requirements. An external auditor has come in the past to 
evaluate user opinion. This has been done once, but has not been repeated due to financial 
costs; however, participant would like to see this external review performed every 3-5 years. 
34 Users are excited about new programs and often take a great interest. They are not afraid of 
upgrades. 
40,41 Firm believes in protecting confidential user data. They understand what they are liable for 
protecting. The participant mentions they take actions such as archiving emails and using 
encryption software but claims these actions are not tied directly to any regulation. Participant 
further believes that if they were under any form of regulation that the industry group to which 
the company belongs or management would inform him; this unfortunately assumes that these 
people are interested or feel they are obligated to find out about such requirements.  
43,44, 
45 
The participant only has a minimal understanding of the security technologies used. In addition, 
the policies are described as “sketchy”. The participant believes that the users know the correct 
thing to do and that if necessary he can take appropriate action before something becomes a 
problem. In this organization, all users have administrator access on system and they purposely 
try to keep data open and easily accessible because people need access to the data and the 
participant believes it is impossible to control data copying and inappropriate transit. There are 
no role based or access controls commonly used, this, however results in a lack of 
accountability should there be an incident. The participant claims that to implement these 
types of controls would be too difficult and would only inhibit productivity.  
46 Security is managed through security-specific consultant. The participant has no real interest in 
this area or expertise and does not seem eager to develop in this area. 
47, 48 Security is not really considered during acquisition and the participant does not believe most 
things would affect security. The participant’s view of security is limited to perimeter/firewall 
ideologies. The participant has mentioned that the majority of his time is spent “fire fighting”, 
but does not seem to realize he can take proactive action to address such issues. Participant 
mentions that the servers are locked down because they are obviously more sensitive and hold 
critical data; it should be noted that he does not recognize that information is then accessible 
and possibly stored on end-user systems. 
50 The participant believes that vendors are out to make “good products” and they are looking to 
sell to top customers. Furthermore, he reasons that because they know they are affecting a lot 
of people and their reputation is at stake they will make good decision for product options and 
security. The participant cannot think of any reason not to trust any commercial big-ticket 
vendors. 
 Participant Summary: The participant does not have a lot of communication with the end 
users. In addition, it appears that upper management and the firm’s partners get involved with 
and directly manage many issues, even when it may be inappropriate or detrimental. While 
their understanding of IT’s importance is improving over time, IT is still not sufficiently 
supported or funded. In addition, the firm and the participant understand that security is 
important but do not seem to have good internal understanding or control, noting that the 
security policies are weak and unenforced. In addition, security mechanisms are weak and not 
well understood; in fact, the organization actively tries to maintain an open environment free of 
security controls and restrictions, which goes against their goal of properly protecting user 




5 The participant does not utilize trade or CIO publications because he believes they have too 
much propaganda. Instead the majority of his information comes from technology interest sites 
such as Slashdot.com and through Google searches. The sources may not direct him to the 
material that is important for him to carry out the more technical aspects of his position. 
7, 8 There is continuous monitoring and possible acquisitions are discussed in weekly IT meetings. 
Often times users will come directly with needs or may even suggest a solution of their choice. 
10 Participant has a consulting background and has collected several useful contacts through his 
previous work. He reuses the contacts who have provided the best advice in the past or who 
would be most familiar with the need that is being evaluated. 
14,16 A staging meeting is planned to set parameters for maintenance, internal understanding, and 
pre-implementation testing. Small user pilot group is setup before full deployment. 
17, 19 The solution was not setup and maintained internally; management brought in the component 
and it was completely maintained by third party vendor. The participant and his group were not 
kept up to date on the status of the component.  The participant believes this issue could have 
been reduced with improved communication efforts with both users and the vendor. 
23 The CEO is really focused on open communication and has an open door policy. As a result 
communication is very open and rich throughout organization. 
25 Management gives an appropriate level of input and they are very good and identifying needs 
and opportunities and asking for IT’s input in a timely manner. 
32 There are uses selecting for testing during pre-implementation. The participant is able to solicit 
feedback from users effectively through managers. After an implementation an informal email 
request for feedback will be sent out or an anonymous survey will be created on SharePoint. 
37 Participant informs users as far out as possible and training starts after the system is in place 
because if users are trained before the system is live there is an increased chance of them 
forgetting. 
15,38 It is odd that he reports no problems or resistance at any time in the process. It is entirely 
possible given his length of time with the company, but perhaps this indicates that he is not 
doing a sufficient job of searching for issues or that proper channels for such reporting do not 
exist. 
40 The focus is on protecting physical assets from theft. The motivation for security is that they 
have placed the expectation upon themselves, however, the participant does not elaborate on 
what this means. There is a lack of detail and understanding of what is important to protect or 
what the goals of security are in the organization; rather, security seems to mean that there is 
some security technology in place. 
42,43 There are confidentiality agreements, but there are no formal policies. There is a very high 
degree of user trust and the participant believes that users need open access and this is also 
part of the CEO’s philosophy on open communication. The open culture is very interesting 
consider that there are a large number of remote workers, though they connect securely and 
with company equipment. The participant does not believe a formal document would change 
anyone’s attitudes or performance and that minimal perimeter and physical security measures 
are sufficient. 
46 The participant’s attitudes towards security are very interesting considering he has previous 
experience as security/firewall practitioner and that a member of his IT team is a computer 
security hobbyist/enthusiast. Perhaps management’s views on openness and the organization’s 
minimal interest in security affect his stance on IT security. 
47 While there are no policies specifically addressing security, there are conscious efforts to 
evaluate security concerns during acquisition. The participant notes that when evaluating a 
vendor/product he looks for clients who are more likely to care about security, such as 
government or military customers. This is an interesting contrast to other participants who 
typically look at what is used in their industry.  
 Participant Summary: In general this participant provided very little input and definition of the 
various actions taken during the acquisition process. The participant did not provide a lot of 
support for his statements. The way that security is viewed in this company is curious 
considering the participant’s background. Security is recognized as something that must be 
addressed; however, management is not very interested and is frustrated by this. The goals and 
purpose of any security efforts are unclear; security seems to exist for the sake of doing 
something which can be called security. While the participant says that security is part of the 
obligation to customers, his answers do not indicate that there are any specific measures taken 
to address any specific concerns, even at a high level (e.g., protect personal information, 
prevent external intrusion). The users are given any unreasonable amount of trust and there is 
no policing or auditing of their actions. In terms of the participant’s external decision input, he 





7 The impetus for acquisition often comes during the annual budgeting process; each business 
unit is interviewed to determine their needs for the upcoming year. In addition, the participant 
may determine a need from his own review of the current systems or it may come directly from 
an revenue generating opportunity proposed by an external customer. 
10 The participant notes that the amount of time research and evaluation is highly correlated with 
the expected dollar cost of the component being acquired. Things which will use up more 
funding will require more backing to substantiate moving forward. In relation to security this 
may be a bad thing because even a low dollar cost may result in a big system impact. 
14 There is a weekly meeting with the CFO where she wants a proven business case to justify the 
cost. To this end, everything must be evaluated and defined including user requirements, site 
preparation, and what people or processes are affected. 
19 The vendor came highly recommended and as a result there was little consideration beyond 
dollar value. The participant notes that he rarely ever expects software to be good because it is 
not until service packs are released that decent quality assurance has been performed. He cites 
a major factor in favoring any particular product is often attributed to support. A clear support 
contract is necessary because, as he stated above, there will always be problems with any 
component. However, it is usually only the big ticket products which have formal support 
contracts specified. Smaller vendors may not see the value in providing support and 
documentation in comparison to the pricing they offer. 
24,25 There is generally good communication in this company. The participant interacts directly with 
the CEO quite often. In addition, the participant and upper management discuss issues in 
regular one-on-one meetings which help filter information both upwards and downwards. 
31 The participant highly values end-user input and believes it increases efficiency and in addition 
makes IT more transparent and the IT department’s contributions more visible at all levels. 
32 Work with users to understand the business requirements and to make sure there is a clear 
translation between IT systems/processes and business objectives. 
34 The participant cites both active and passive resistance to the introduction of new systems. The 
users feel like they are being punished with a system change. It should be noted that while 
communication is very good and their needs are considered (see #32) there is minimal user 
involvement in the selection and decision process. 
37 The participant provides training about a month out and informs users of selection choice very 
early on in the process. They have experimented with when to train users and now start efforts 
when the product is in the implementation/validation phase. The end users further are involved 
in writing custom documentation, which also helps established business user SMEs. 
40 External customers have specific regulatory measures which then affect how the participant 
and his organization implement security protection. A large percentage of the security auditing 
is supported or performed by the customers or their consultants. In general the participant 
notes he prefers efficiency over security. 
42 The participant notes that there are no specific security guidelines for the acquisition process 
but that the business requirements may define any security concerns, but not necessarily. 
43,44 As the company grows in size there is an increased concern for end-user security and they are 
working to establish retraining efforts. The participant recognizes the possibility of insider 
threats. The users work in tightly controlled environments and efforts are made to provide 
read-only access whenever possible and customer data and critical information is highly 
segregated. At the same time, internal company data is not controlled as much and is relatively 
open. 
46 Participant responds that he believes internal controls are sufficient and more effort would only 
be needed with a public presence or if there was some external portal. However, current 
internal production systems are not completely blocked from external access. 
 Participant Summary: The participant enjoys good support from upper management in terms of 
acquisitions and security. There is a high level of consideration with users, but a limited amount 
of actual involvement in the decision making process. Security is perceived at a perimeter level 
and the participant operates under the assumption that compliance with broad regulations is 
sufficient to define an adequate level of security for the organization. Beyond compliance, 
security is seen as a nuisance and is not embraced; internal data that does not belong to 




4 The participant has a relatively large IT staff and makes efforts to ensure they are going to 
training and conferences. He can go to training/conferences when he requests. 
7 The initiator may be either a business analyst within IT or a representative of a particular 
business unit. Needs are then discussed and evaluated as a joint effort between the business 
unit and the IT group.  
11 The participant primarily looks for flexibility and scalability in a product, where is the product 
going in the future and will it grow with our needs. Moreover, the quality of the vendor is 
extremely important and is the second most important factor after price. The participant looks 
to form partnerships with vendors. Beyond analyzing the product offerings he wants to know 
that the vendor is financially stable and what comprises their business vision and strategy in 
order to evaluate long-term value and sustainability of support over time. As a partner, the 
participant notes it is important to evaluate what the vendor can do for your business beyond 
simply selling you a product. 
 
15 The participant notes that in general the culture of the organization is interested in maintaining 
the status quo. When change is needed, business units may come requesting a specific product 
rather than identifying core needs and requirements. It can be difficult to get the business users 
to sit down and discuss the requirements and details. Because the assets are ultimately 
implemented and maintained by the IT team, it is important for them to pick the best products 
for the total IT infrastructure rather than the business units preferred selection, which may not 
have been researched or selected through a comparative analysis. 
19 The participant stresses the importance of performing sufficient due diligence to ensure that as 
many issues are addresses proactively as possible and that strong communication is important 
throughout the process with users, vendors, and within the IT team. If necessary, you must be 
willing to modify timelines and plans to address concerns before they become problems. 
24,25, 
28 
Some people view IT as a cost center, while other members of management look to establish 
partnership relationships across the business with IT. The participant enjoys very good two-way 
communication with upper management, including the board of directors. While not all 
members of management are concerned with IT, those that do understand how IT will help 
drive the business forward.  
29 The participant believes that the acquisition selection does not have a large impact on the 
company. Those who complain about a particular system or component often have a personal 
agenda or bias and usually do not have business rationale as their justification. Combined with 
the response to #15 above, it would seem that the participant uses business justification over 
user acceptance as the metric for measuring system success. 
32 User complaints are factored into the process through reviewing support tickets. Users are then 
brought on early to the decision making team. However, it seems from the previous responses 
that their purpose is mainly for IT to understand the business requirements and they may not 
have limited decision influence.  
34 He notes that the end-users are fairly resistant, but that this reluctance is decreasing over time. 
He attributes this change to policies he has enacted since joining the company. In the past 
acquisitions were largely decided by the business units and the IT team would simply 
administrate these systems and there was a general lack of internal partnering. Also, in the past 
a policy of using preferred vendors led to poor selections, which as a result lowered end-user 
confidence in the performance of new components and systems. 
40 The organization has both internal and external motivations. The external motivations come 
from regulatory compliance and customer security requirements. Internally, there is a focus on 
both protecting customer data and on protecting the organization’s proprietary information 
and intellectual property. 
43,45 The users are consciously aware of the policies and must sign an acceptance of the policies 
annually. The participant notes that the language is very clear, without acronyms, and it would 
be very difficult to plead ignorance of the rules. Management is very tough on security and non-
compliance has resulted in past terminations. 
47 Security is primarily considered as business requirements, not a technical requirement. While it 
is good to match any IT need to a business objective, some security must exist purely 
technically as a type of overhead or there is a risk of having insufficient security when it is not 




The participant again notes that all decision must be logical and that emotional impact on 
decisions should be minimized. Even within the IT organization, is it important to remember the 
business requirements. In addition, whenever possible components should be commoditized; a 
component should plug-in easily with the system and it should be possible to replace that 
component with a similar option without much modification to the overall IT infrastructure? 
 Participant Summary: The participant has extensive business experience and enjoys an 
organization with strong communication. He has a very strong business focus and works very 
hard to tie together IT and business objectives. The one concern is that all security concerns 
may not be considered in a business justification or from internal IT projects. In addition, while 
there is communication and involvement with the end-users, it does not appear that the 




4 Attend conferences and events regularly because the organization wants to know what is going 
on in the industry and what the market is looking for to better target the organization’s product 
offerings. 
7 On a monthly basis the IT team meets and any members of the IT team can make suggestions. 
Almost all acquisition projects are initiated by the IT team. Most projects focus on solving 
problems, there is very little opportunity seeking in this organization. 
11 The participant defines the systems and components that he acquires as mainstream, defining 
the organization’s IT needs as “vanilla”. Preferred vendors are almost always used in the 
acquisition process. The mainstream is defined by the participant “as small businesses” or 
“common to any business”. There is very little experimentation and the participant believes 
that by sticking the mainstream they are getting products “which are tried and true” and that 
users will be most comfortable with. This philosophy, however, makes assumptions that their IT 
needs truly are vanilla and that the masses have made an informed decision, rather than relying 
on the same wisdom of the crowd philosophy. 
12,13 These definitions are very weak and the decision maker relies heavily upon his staff doing a 
thorough evaluation and research; however, there is no guarantee that they are using any 
common criteria or any criteria in their decisions at all as far as the decision maker is aware. 
17,18, 
19 
On an upgrade projects there was poor communication between IT and the business unit. The 
business unit was heavily resistant about changing their infrastructure. As a result, there was a 
termination. The participant believes that in the future better communication is needed with a 
clearer focus on business objectives as opposed to emotional and personal biases. 
25 There is limited communication and direction. Management expresses some interest, but they 
are not highly interested in following up 
26 Management’s involvement in decision making is limited; however, it does increase if they are 
personally interested in a particular acquisition project.  
32 Users are not formally part of the acquisition process; however, the IT team monitors the 
helpdesk to identify user-focused issues. The participant also commented on the support 
system explaining that there was too much in-person support requests and they are trying to 
force increased usage of the helpdesk system. 
37 A rollout process is defined before implementation; however, the participant explains that 
there is no common criteria or time frames that he can recall over time. 
39 Security is of growing importance to management as they increase the amount of work where 
customers require certain security standards and implementations in order to compete for 
contracts.  
41 The participant described the majority of the regulations as being non-technical dealing with 
export agreements and international trade agreements.  The participant believes that 
enforcement of these policies is more casual then through any technical or internal policy 
means. 
42 They are working on developing new policies and have plans to include security through the 
SDLC because having such policies specified will be a direct requirement of their external 
customers. 
44 There are minimal concerns for internal issues such as data leakage. The participant trusts his 
employees “because they are an asset of the organization”, which is a very weak argument that 
lacks any rationale. There is a culture of trust in the organization, and a minimal amount of 
user-control. In regards to compliance with regulations, he believes the employees are aware of 
their requirements, but notes that there is currently no way to enforce or monitor compliance. 
50 While the participant trusts his end-users, he would like to implement some controls to prevent 
accidental breeches of policy or poor security actions. Security is just beginning to be important 
to this organization and that participant believes that awareness and controls will increase as 
management increases their understanding of the importance it has specifically for them to do 
business with their external clients. Lastly, the participant notes that being overzealous about 
security could be just as costly as not doing enough, however, there is no mechanism or 
measure in this organization to see where they are on that continuum.  
 Participant Summary: While management understands the importance of IT, they are not 
highly concerned with its operation unless they are personally involved. There is also minimal 
user involvement while there is some consideration. Because the organization believes their IT 
needs are vanilla, they assume they already have what they need and there is very little 
searching for opportunities. As a result, they do not search for reasons to disprove the vanilla 
theory by querying more user opinion. This also has the effect that users are not expecting the 
systems to be customized to their needs therefore making it hard to anticipate any direct 
benefit to themselves as the result of new system or component. Because security is needed in 
order to remain competitive and there will be a very high amount of external pressure, it is very 
likely that security will increase over time, especially because management is beginning to 
understand how security is a necessary cost. However, this may not lead to the best possible 
security fit for this organization because there is no internal pressure or internal consideration 
of the realistically non-vanilla needs. 
 
 
